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Introduction
Decision-making can be as simple as deciding to draw to an
inside straiaht in poker, the favorite game of Herbert 0.
Yardley, head of the American cryptographic unit from World War I
to 1929. It can also be as complex as the process of formulating
the national war plan. In statecraft and the making of war,
intelligence—knowledge of one's opponent—has long been
recognized as a part of the decision-making process. Knowing the
peaceful intentions of a potential enemy can free a nation to
take the initiative elsewhere. In warfare, information of the
enemy's route of march, strengths and intentions can effect the
outcome of battle. The purpose of this paper is to examine the
Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922 and the relationship
between the agreements reached and the knowledge provided
Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes through a particular type
of intelligence, signals intelligence.
Little used until the twentieth century, signals
intelligence or SIGINT is the gathering of information from
communications sources: cables, telegrams, radio, television,
correspondence, and even today's satellite telecommunications.
The process is three-fold. First is the interception of the
information, second, its deciphering into a plain text, and
finally, the most subjective aspect of the process, the
interpretation of data and intent.
Analysis of the information and the owner's intent is then
incorporated into the overall assessment of the situation and
thereby influences the decision-making process. The impact of
SIGINT varies with the information collected and the abilities,
personalities and perspectives of the users. Also, SIGINT is
only one factor considered in the making of decisions. For
example, SIGINT may inform an army that the enemy appears to be
building up for an offensive against a certain part of the front
but, due to political concerns such as the safeguarding of the
capital, the extra forces needed to blunt the possible attack may
not be available.
The most spectacular SIGINT revelation in the twentieth
century has been the use of ULTRA to read German messages during
World War II. Information obtained by ULTRA was instrumental in
preparing the Allies to absorb the German counter-attack in
early August 1944 against the American sector. Even so, much
of the time ULTRA served only to confirm tentative conclusions
previously reached by the Allies. Additionally, out of fear of
compromising ULTRA as a source of intelligence, much information
could not be acted upon. Thus, SIGINT alone is rarely the only
basis for reaching decisions.
Although the sensational events of ULTRA have received the
majority of attention, significant use of SIGINT occurred earlier
during World War I. Early in the war the British set up a
decoding and deciphering organization in Room 40 of the Old
Admiralty Building. The precursor of the Bletchley Park team of
ULTRA, Room 40 provided the starting point for signals
intelligence in the twentieth century. Indeed, some of Room 40 '
s
personnel returned in 1939-1940 to again serve their country in
the field of signals intelligence. Throughout four years of war
Room 40 worked diligently to supply the Admiralty with
i i
information ranging from German fleet and U-boat movements, to
blockade running, to various diplomatic correspondence
including the Zimmerman telegram.
Several years prior to the Washington Naval Conference of
1921-1922, the War Department created an intelligence unit for
code and cipher work. Unofficially called the American Black
Chamber and directed by Herbert 0. Yardley, this unit followed in
the footsteps of Room 40 and provided a link of continuity in
SIGINT between the world wars. This unit cracked the Japanese
diplomatic ciphers then in use and during the conference decripts
were regularly forwarded to Secretary Hughes, head of the
American delegation. The information ranged from one day to as
much as two weeks old, depending on the cipher used and on the
work load of the Chamber.
Since the unveiling of ULTRA, the tendency has been to
sensationalize and perhaps ascribe too much credit to signals
intelligence in war and peace. Examining available evidence
suggests that rather than providing information for a specific
breakthrough, Hughes utilized the Black Chamber more to confirm
and reinforce decisions previously reached before the conference.
Information gained during the summer prior to the conference
indicated a Japanese willingness to reduce armaments and
compromise. Japanese cables deciphered during the conference
along with face to face meetings with the Japanese delegation
tallied with those earlier intercepts. Although the Black
Chamber provided both hard information such as the naval ratio
options the Japanese would consider, and "soft" information
relative to their negotiating attitudes and intentions, the
consistency shown by Hughes from the outset indicates a
pre-conference plan little altered during the negotiations.
SIGINT's role during the Washington Naval Conference illustrates
the continuity of signals intelligence from Room 40 during World
War I to the more publicized accomplishments of ULTRA in World
War II.
This is to thank Dr. Donald Mrozek, who made me into a
better writer, in spite of myself, and thanks to the rest of my
committee for their support. I would also like to thank my wife,
Catherine, for her patience— she must have wanted to kick me on
occasion to move me along but somehow restrained herself.
Chapter I. Continuity: SIGINT from Room 40 to ULTRA
While the episodes of ULTRA in Europe and MAGIC in the
Pacific were the two most spectacular examples of signals
intelligence in the twentieth century, they were by no means the
first applications of SIGINT. Looking back from ULTRA and MAGIC
a line of continuity can be traced to Yardley's Black Chamber and
then to Britain's Room 40 of World War I. The literature of
signals intelligence reflects this continuity and, not
surprisingly, the majority of it appeared after the ULTRA
revelations in the mid-1970 's, with many of the works dealing
with World War II SIGINT efforts. Examining the SIGINT
literature aids in understanding the origins, uses and continuity
of signals intelligence, as well as the American Black Chamber's
place within that context.
Although works on intelligence and cryptography can be
found dating from the 16th and 17th centuries, as a field of
study the subject is a product of the twentieth century. As a
general rule the historiography of intelligence, including
SIGINT, emphasizes the sensational breakthroughs such as ULTRA
and MAGIC or broad histories as in The Armies of Ignorance , a
history of American intelligence. Very little has been written
on intelligence as part of the decision-making process: is it
more useful for the hard data provided or for the light it sheds
on the enemy's intentions? Does signals intelligence consist
mainly of dramatic discoveries or the more mundane job of
decoding and deciphering routine communications? This aspect of
2intelligence, especially in signals intelligence, requires closer
examination in the future.
A good starting point for twentieth century intelligence
literature are Herbert 0. Yardley's works and the subsequent
furor surrounding them. Yardley's first book, The Ameri can Black
Chamber appeared in 1931. Disappointed at the disbanding and
reorganizing of the cryptographic unit, Yardley hoped to maintain
an income through the sale of a book recounting the exploits of
the Chamber. Especially significant was the revelation of the
Chamber's efforts at deciphering Japanese messages during the
Washington Naval Conference. Specific information about the
messages delivered to Charles Evans Hughes tended to be sketchy;
nor was there any detailed picture of the Vaerican delegation's
decision-making process. Still, the book ln.Uoate.1 Important
points to consider. *iret and most basio *ae the introduction
of
SIGIN7 into the decision-making process itself. Information
on
what the "other side" had, planned to 'a.w«, and *hat V'V
Intended to do rfi.th their military hardware beea** » part
if. !:*».>
context in *hlch laolsu'vis vera made.
Yardley stated that both t'n '7 •' m! 7 ' ^-' '
'
, ''' 1
'
:: ',!!lc,;
jointly fundel the Black Chamber with the *K*tM ^apartment
carrying most of the costs.
2 This arra.icre.oant exlsta.l for ova.
ten years, ami so it would seem plausible that both
departments
found the information provided useful. The uproar over the
publication of Tj,e_ A meH can B lack Chamber reinforces this
conclusion. Lieutenant-Colonel O.S. Albright, Chief of the
Communications Section reviewed the book in June 1931 for Colonel
3Alfred T. Smith, Army Chief of Staff, G-2, and concluded that
although the book contained many exaggerations and distorted
statements relative toYardley's role, the basic facts were
correct.
3
Thus, while it is difficult to know the exact extent
of Yardley's and the Chamber's role at the Washington Conference,
this official assessment makes it credible to assume that the
Chamber's efforts were relevant.
The hornet's nest stirred up by Yardley's book continued,
with the pros and cons of the Chamber's activities and Yardley's
4
revelations bandied about in newspaper articles and journals.
Official concern about additional disclosures by Yardley
continued into 1933 when agents of the federal government seized
a second "Yardley" manuscript prior to publication. Entitled
Japanese Diplomatic Secrets , it contained a more in-depth picture
of the Chamber's work during the Washington Conference. Of most
value were the decoded messages to and from the Japanese
delegation. Again, little information was provided pertaining to
the deliberations of the American delegation. Still, the seizure
and withholding of the manuscript in the Justice Department files
for fifty years indicated its potentially sensitive nature and
reinforce Yardley's claims on behalf of the Black Chamber.
Several classified histories dealing with intelligence and
SIGINT followed Yardley's sensational revelations. In 1942-1943
William F. Friedman, another major figure in American
intelligence history, wrote A Brief History of the Signal
Intelligence Service . Declassified in 1979, it is a short survey
of American signal intelligence efforts and organization into the
1930' s. Friedman leaves no question about his opinion of
Yardley, believing him a disgruntled careerist primarily-
interested in obtaining a secure and lucrative position within
the federal government. In Friedman's opinion, Yardley 's book
damaged American security interests, making it difficult to
procure funds for the cryptanalytic bureau and thus impairing the
general decision-making process.
Three years later Friedman prepared another classified
survey that covered the 1930 's up to the outbreak of World War
II : Expansion of the Signal Intelligence Service from
1930-7December 1941 . Here Friedman described the organization of
the Signal Intelligence Service, the heir of Yardley 's operation
of the 1920' s. within the War Department and the difficulty of
securing adequate funding in order to maintain peace-time
training for the section. He related how the service
consolidated the various duties of signals intelligence: code
and cipher compiling and solving, interception and location of
enemy transmissions and the developing and detecting of secret
inks. Friedman then briefly touched upon the expansion of the
service after 1939, the breaking of the Japanese Purple code and
the general developments of the period immediately before Pearl
Harbor.
Laurance F. Safford, USN (retired) prepared another
classified manuscript in 1952, entitled A Brief History of
Communications Intelligence in the United States . Safford' s work
was similar to Friedman's in that he covered the evolution of the
intelligence services as institutions. Interestingly enough.
5Army-Navy collaboration on Japanese diplomatic codes in the
1930 's did not extend to Japanese naval and military codes.
Although information was occasionally passed back and forth, the
deciphering procedures remained within the respective services.
In contrast, Yardley's organization was unique with its
7
interdepartmental funding.
Safford related several examples of SIGINT successes in his
brief history. A Japanese code stolen in 1922 by the FBI, OfTI
and the New York Police provided a comprehensive picture of the
Grand Japanese Naval Maneuvers of 1930. With this information,
the Chief of Naval Operations knew that the Japanese army
invading Manchuria a few months later had "its rear guarded by
Naval forces superior in strength to the peace-time U.S.
Navy."
8 The breaking of the 1930 Naval Code provided the
invaluable information that the battleship Nagato 's
post-modernization speed was twenty-six knots, the same as the
Kongo class battle cruisers. 3y inference, the speed of the
modernized Mutsu and the new Yamato class battleships would also
be twenty-six knots. This information directly influenced the
American decision to give the battleships North Carolina and
Washington twenty-seven knot speeds and later battleships a speed
of twenty-eight knots.
In 196 7, The Codebreakers and The Broken Seal explored the
under-reported subject of SIGINT and intelligence. The paucity
of works reflected three things: the sensitive nature of the
topic in government circles, the lack of declassified source
material for research and a general neglect of intelligence as an
6aspect of military and diplomatic history. In The Codebreakers
,
David Kahn tied together the various threads of espionage,
codework and intelligence gathering from antiquity to the
present. A comprehensive effort. The Codebreakers remains a
natural starting point for anyone doing research on the subject
as it existed before the mid-1960 's.
Kahn covers the history of the science and art of signals
intelligence with good detail on Yardley and the Black Chamber.
He then describes the reorganization of the section within the
War Department in the 1930' s, with William F. Friedman as the
guiding light. Kahn provides the reader with numerous examples
of SIGINT's influence from the Dreyfus Affair at the turn of the
century to post-World War II espionage and SIGINT efforts. A
sound work, it will need periodic updating due to newly
discovered or declassified material.
More specific in scope, The Broken Seal (1967) by Ladislas
Farago traces the breaking of the Japanese Purple code,
Operation MAGIC. Essentially, Farago makes no new major
disclosures about events leading up to Pearl Harbor, but instead
fleshes out earlier accounts. In reference to the Washington
Naval Conference, Farago argues that Japan's objection to the
ratio assigned her was not remarkable but rather it was the
United States refusal to compromise that catches one's attention.
According to Farago this obstinacy resulted in much criticism of
9the Americans. Farago also states a courier arrived daily in
Washington with deciphered cables from Yardley' s unit. Farago's
work implies that Hughes' negotiating tactics and
subsequent success depended essentially upon the information
furnished by the Black Chamber.
In retrospect, the tone of The Broken Seal is one of
oversimplification and uncritical credit to signals intelligence
for success at Washington. Writing in the "popular narrative"
style without footnotes but only general chapter notes, Farago
fails to couple the narrative flow of a Bruce Catton or Shelby
Foote with their solid historical research. In reference to
Yardley and Washington Conference, Farago is unsophisticated in
his analysis of the information produced by the Black Chamber and
fails to examine the flow of events or determine the Black
Chamber's place in the decision-making picture.
Those interested in the early organizational history of
American intelligence would do well to start with The Emergence
of the War Department Intelligence Agency: 1885-1918
, a Master's
thesis by Marc Powe, Kansas State University (1974). In it Powe
argues that the War Department created a Bureau of Military
Information in 1885 to provide data. Beginning as an element of
the General Staff, the reorganization of 1908 placed the unit
within the War College Division. The Bureau fell into general
disuse from 1910 to 1916, when the demands of World War I marked
an upswing in military intelligence fortunes. Powe concludes
that the Military Intelligence Agency of 1917 was not new but
provided information as did its predecessors, indicating
institutional continuity.
The year Powe's thesis appeared marked an increase in works
dealing with intelligence and SIGINT. Acting as the catalyst for
the works were private memoirs and source material available from
World War II, the principal subject being ULTRA. The book that
signaled the new era was The Ultra Secret by F.W. Winterbotham.
As the original head of the overall ULTRA team, Winterbotham
obviously knew or had access to information on the breaking of
the German codes and the uses thereof. Winterbotham continued
the trend, still alive today, of ascribing virtually total credit
for winning the war to signals intelligence without analyzing the
decision-making process itself and SIGINT's place within that
i ^ 12context.
Numerous claims have been made for ULTRA, but not all can be
clearly substantiated. It has been argued that Lord Gort
retreated to Dunkirk upon receiving the ULTRA information that
von Runstedt had turned his forces north, yet Gort had already
planned to retreat before such information reached him. In fact,
since Chief of the Imperial General Staff Ironside went in person
to forbid Gort to retreat, one wonders just what, if any, ULTRA'S
role was at Dunkirk.
13 This example indicates that since the
deliberations of those making the decisions are often not
available, care must be taken when evaluating SIGINT's
contributions.
A number of other works also deal with ULTRA and its impact
in World War II. Ronald Lewin's Ultra Goes to War (1978)
continued the praise of ULTRA, pointing out its value in deducing
such information as Rommel's supply shortage in North Africa, the
German belief that Normandy was safe from invasion, and Hitler's
orders for a counter-attack in early August at Normandy.
9Even so, Lewin wisely emphasizes that men, material and
will-power win battles, secret information notwithstanding.
In a book with a different thrust, Gordon Welchman's The Hut
Six Story (1982) did more than describe the inner workings of the
ULTRA team of which he was part. Welchman also stresses the
flexibility and originality that led to the ULTRA breakthrough
and its implementation. Welchman concludes that these attributes
are necessary if the West is to survive the Soviet threat.
Ralph Bennet, an historian before the war and another of the
Bletchley Park team, wrote Ultra in the West in 1979. The value
of Bennet' s work is the emphasis he places on ULTRA as an
information provider, the product of which would be acted upon by
others. Since he points out that strategic analysis was done by
the various service intelligence agencies and not ULTRA, Bennet
places SIGINT within the overall decision-making context rather
than as the omniscient fount of knowledge and sole actor in the
14process.
Ronald Lewin's The American Magic (1982) shifts attention to
the Pacific theater during World War II. Relative to Pearl
Harbor, Lewin concludes that SIGINT and the means of evaluating
and distributing it were not sufficiently developed to avert
disaster. As do most other scholars, whether "fans" of SIGINT or
not, Lewin argues that MAGIC aided the American efforts at Coral
Sea and Midway. More pertinent to this paper, Lewin, too,
pictured Hughes at the Washington Conference as possessing all
useful knowledge of the Japanese position and mentality. With
such information he need not compromise but only wait for the
10
Japanese to give in.
A short work by William F. Friedman and Charles
J.
Mendelsohn entitled The Zimmer man Telegram of
January 16, 1917
and its Cryptographic Background
appeared in 1978. According to
the introduction, it is "an authoritative
background story of the
Zimmerman Telegram which was classified CONFIDENTIAL
by the U.S.
Government for 45 years after World War I." Although
short, the
book nicely ties together the story of the
telegram: the German
proposal to Mexico, the British interception and
deciphering of
the message and the general uproar it caused
once released to the
public. What is particularly interesting about
this work is the
double classification involved with the subject. First,
the
British and Admiral Hall kept the secret of
Room 40 ' s involvement
in the Zimmerman telegram for as long as
possible. On top of
that, Friedman and Mendelsohn wrote this work
some twenty years
after the incident and then the US Government
classified it.
Apparently neither the United States nor Great
Britain wished the
details of the Zimmerman decoding to be made
public.
Three works published in the 1970 's dealt
with intelligence
on a broader scale than simply ULTRA or
MAGIC. F.H. Kinsley's
British Intelligence in the Se cond World War
and David Kahn '
s
Hitler's Spies focused on the respective British
and German
intelligence efforts in World War II while
William R. Corson's
The Armies of Ignorance attempted to trace the
history of
American intelligence through the Carter
administration.
Although using extensive source material,
Corson leaves the
11
impression of having attempted too much. His treatment of early
American intelligence history is skimpy, and Corson's lack of
footnotes reinforces the desire for more information. In spite
of listing Yardley's The American Black Chamber in the
bibliography, scant mention is made of Yardley and none of the
Washington Naval Conference. While valuable in many respects to
intelligence historiography. The Armies of Ignorance deals weakly
with the period of 1900-1930.
Both Hitler's Spies and British Intelligence in the Second
World War (v. I) make substantive contributions to intelligence
historiography. Kahn breaks his book into four sections:
sources of intelligence, the analyzers of German military
intelligence, three major military intelligence cases
(Barbarossa, Torch and Overlord), and a concluding epilogue.
Kahn argues that German intelligence suffered from a variety
of problems. In the preparation for Operation Barbarossa, Hitler
desired only tactical intelligence, the number of Soviet units
and their locations. German intelligence did not have a role in
the assessment of the Soviet military machine or Germany's
chances in a war with the Soviet Union. To compound the
errors of omission, German and Nazi arrogance prevented a more
objective appraisal of Soviet military capabilities.
Kahn believes that with respect to Torch and Overlord, the
Germans suffered from a lack of adequate intelligence sources and
at the same time were simply fooled by Allied deception efforts.
Kahn concludes that German military intelligence ultimately
failed in its mission, particularly in the interpretation of
12
data.
British Intelligence in the Second World War by Hinsley and
his associates is the very interesting first volume of an
official history. Rather than dwelling exclusively with the
major intelligence coups, as do most of the ULTRA and MAGIC
works, Hinsley examines the general process of intelligence
gathering, analyzing and interpreting. Hinsley does not
constantly praise British intelligence efforts but critically
examines the failures and bureaucratic infighting that reduced
intelligence effectiveness. Hinsley quite correctly points out
how outside factors intruded into the intelligence process.
Thus, the large mass of data from non-SIGINT sources
(photo-reconnaissance, the Secret Intelligence Service, captured
documents, etc. ) curtailed the analysis time for signals
intelligence resulting in a misinterpretation of the information
indicating Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the
Soviet Union. Due to bureaucratic jealousy, the War Office, Air
Ministry and Admiralty refused to cooperate and pool resources.
Mso, the services did not always utilize intelligence
information in formulating policy. According Hinsley, if the Air
Ministry had contacted Whitehall they would have learned that
the make-up of the Luftwaffe indicated the intent to use it for
close support of the German army rather than as an independent
strategic instrument.
A very valuable contribution to intelligence studies is the
mu It i- volume United States Military Intelligence 1917-1927
(1979), edited by Richard Challener of Princeton University. The
13
set consists of recently declassified daily and weekly military
intelligence summaries from the period and serves to illustrate
military intelligence perceptions of world events. Regarding the
Washington Conference it is informative to note that military
intelligence analysts concluded that the Japanese plan for a
larger fleet enhanced the probability of the renewal of the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The potential threat of an enlarged
Japanese fleet would act as a lever to persuade the British to
continue the alliance. The analysts believed that Japanese naval
expansion was not directed primarily at the United States but was
a tool to help maintain the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The
"relatively minor importance" of American Paci fie possessions
made the United States a secondary strategic concern for
16Japan.
Finally, the appearance of Patrick Beesly's Room 40 in 1982
perhaps best reflects the tendency to concentrate on World War II
signals intelligence. Not until eight years after the ULTRA
disclosures occurred did a book appear that dealt with the
organization that preceded the Black Chamber and Bletchley Park.
Beesly's book provides excellent information on the uses and
limitations of signals intelligence, and the dangers of over-
centralization and secrecy. For example, at the Dogger Bank
action of January 1915, Room 40 decoded messages pinpointing the
locations of U-boats. Unfortunately, due to overcentralization,
that is, the concentrating of control of such information into
only three or four hands, the locations were not signalled to
Admiral Beatty for two hours. Beatty believed the U-boats
14
were nearby and ordered a change in course which slowed British
pursuit of the German squadron. Only later did Beatty receive
information indicating that the U-boats were forty miles to the
M. 17s ou th
.
Beesly gives other such examples of the problems inherent in
a new process such as utilizing signals intelligence. Even so,
he argues that Room 40 provided the Royal Navy with the edge it
needed. The British quickly knew of the German fleet movements
even if not the purpose behind them. This information made it
possible for the Royal Navy to prepare for German sorties and lay
traps for the High Seas Fleet. If the Royal Navy did not
ultimately destroy the German fleet, it was not due to the
failure of Room 40, but reflected the complexities of the
decision-making process as a whole, of which SIGINT was only one
part. Room 40 contributes much to the understanding of the
signals intelligence role and joins Kahn's The Codebreakers as a
basic work in the field.
Although numerous works on intelligence and SIGINT have
appeared since The Ultra Secret in 1974, much remains to be
investigated. The role of SIGINT after World War II in
particular requires examination. Perhaps the greatest weakness
of the field at present is the tendency to view SIGINT as an
independent maker of history, rather than as one part within the
decision-making process.
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Chapter II. SIGINT in the Twentieth Century and the Origins
of the American Black Chamber
The tools of the intelligence process evolved throughout the
twentieth century, paralleling man's scientific and technical
progress. While the instruments changed, the fundamental
functions remained constant, providing information to aid in
defining enemy capabilities and intentions. Hard data of various
types furnished information such as the speed and degree of
strength with which the German army could mobilize in 1938. The
scope of useful data was broad and really limited only by the
analyzer's imagination. The intentions uncovered ranged from the
specific, such as a delegation's objectives at a conference, to
the general, as in the overall direction of a nation's foreign
policy.
Signals intelligence is a specific type of intelligence.
SIGINT provides information based upon another party's
communications. The first step in the signals intelligence
process is the interception of communications, for example,
tapping into cable lines, listening to radio signals or obtaining
documents. If the information is in a code or cipher it must be
broken down so as to be understandable. Decoding involves the
use of a codebook containing the coded words and their agreed
meaning. In decipherment there are substitutions or
transpositions of letters and in order to understand the message
the pattern must be discovered.
Direction finding or triangulation is another method
16
utilized in signals intelligence. The interception of a signal
at two known points makes possible the pinpointing of the
transmitter. The known points become the vertices of a trangle
with a known baseline. With the two direction finders aimed
towards the signal's strongest point the transmitter can be
pinpointed by extending two lines from the direction finders,
where they intersect is the location of the transmitter.
Direction finding is a valuable war-time tool and was utilized in
both world wars. Opposing navies found it useful for pinpointing
enemy naval forces such as the British Admiralty keeping watch
over the German High Seas Fleet.
Once obtained, signals intelligence can be combined with
information from other sources to create a broad and more
detailed picture. The hard data indicates capabilities and
possible designs, while soft information from various sources
such as television and radio, communications networks, journals
and newspapers add substance to the framework of hard data.
Interpretations can then be made based upon this picture of
capabilities and intentions. Since drawing conclusions is a
subjective procedure, the results are often influenced by the
biases, prejudices and even interests of those evaluating the
information. This frequently results in conflicting conclusions
by those utilizing the data.
Decision-making, potentially a very complex process, demands
that many factors be weighed before a conclusion is reached.
Often the data conflict with one another, hard data may be
contradictory or very different from soft and either or both of
17
these may be at variance with the assumptions or interests of the
decision- maker. The question of credibility further complicates
the process. Data provided by a loyal agent could be at odds
with that provided by signals intelligence but still considered
more credible or vice versa. Obviously, SIGINT is only one
element integrated into the decision-making process and care must
be taken as to how much influence is credited it.
Although its potential would be more fully realized during
the two world wars, nineteenth century strategists recognized the
implications of cable communications and signals intelligence.
The telegraphic cable of the mid-1880' s provided speedy
international communications but was subject to interception if
it was part of a land network passing through foreign nations.
In contrast, submarine telegraph cables provided a potentially
more secure communications system. Under friendly control speedy
communications could be effected throughout a nation or empire.
In threat of war, mobilization would be swifter and strategic
plans implimented with less delay, although if intercepted by an
enemy, this information would be subject to the enemy's
evaluation and use.
As a holder of the most wide-flung empire, Britain pioneered
the attempt to create an empire-wide communications system at
this time. The projected "all red" system would never touch
foreign soil, thus securing British communications from signals
1 8intelligence efforts of other nations. In case of war, an
empire-wide cable system would allow the government to coordinate
its armed forces and would be especially valuable for fleet
18
control. In turn,, the system provided a sense of security for
colonies far from the mother-country.
Offensively Britain drew up plans to sever the cable
communications of her likely enemies. In 1898 these plans
centered around Russia, Japan, and the United States. By 1911,
changes in the international situation replaced these three
19
powers with Germany or the Triple Alliance. The cutting of
cables and occupying of transmitting stations could isolate
Britain's enemies, as actually happened to Germany in World War
I. By controlling cable systems Britain would possess valuable
information to use as needed, as she did the Zimmerman Telegram
of 1917.
The British efforts to set up the "all red" system did not
escape the attention of other powers. The United States annexed
Guam and Midway in order to provide cable stations to the
Philippines. The Germans also attempted to set up a system under
their control but dependence upon British technical expertise
20
undermined this venture. Perceiving the advantages of
Britain's control of the world-wide cable system, the French
government noted in its telegraph bill of November 1900:
"England owes her influence in the world perhaps more to her
cable communications than to her navy. She controls the news,
and makes it serve her policy and commerce in a marvellous
,,21
manner.
Prior to World War I the Dreyfus Affair in France also
illustrated the potential usefulness of signals intelligence. In
mid-October 1894, Captain Alfred Dreyfus of the French army was
19
arrested for providing Germany with information. The
anti-Semitic journal La Libre Parole broke the story on November
1, accusing Dreyfus of being in the pay of Germany or Italy. The
next day the Italian military attache telegrammed Rome requesting
an official denial of the story if it was false. The French
obtained a copy of this telegram which was taken to the Foreign
,
.
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Ministry for solving.
The Foreign Ministry had produced an exact solution except
for the ending by November 6. The translation read: "If
Captain
Dreyfus has not had relations with you, it would be wise to have
the ambassador deny it officially. Our emissary is warned."
This last sentence hinted at Dreyfus' guilt, and Colonel Jean
Sandherr, head of army intelligence passed the translation on to
his superiors hoping it would help convict Dreyfus.
Continuing their efforts, the cryptanalysts worked at
deciphering the ending. By November 10 the French believed they
had a more accurate decipherment of the message. The
telegram
now read: "If Captain Dreyfus has not had relations with
you, it
would be wise to have the ambassador deny it officially,
to avoid
press comment." In order to confirm the accuracy of the
translation the French tricked the Italian military attache
into
passing specific information on to Rome. The French again
obtained a copy of the telegram and began deciphering it.
They
completed the decipherment on November 13 and it confirmed
the
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accuracy of the second decipherment exonerating Dreyfus.
At this point other interests intervened. Some
officers
argued it was better to convict Dreyfus rather than
openly admit
20
a mistake by the French army. Other officers followed their
anti-Semitic inclinations and continued to press for Dreyfus'
conviction. The court refused to allow the deciphered telegram
to be entered as evidence, and sentenced Dreyfus to Devil's
Island. In 1899 the correct version of the telegram finally
entered the records. Still, not until 1906 did Dreyfus win
.. u .
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vindication.
Although the ordeal of Dreyfus stretched out over a decade,
information provided by signals intelligence could possibly have
terminated the proceedings within several months. Rather than
reflecting a shortcoming of SIGINT, the Dreyfus Affair
illustrates the varied elements that contribute to the
decision-making process. In this instance institutional
concerns, domestic politics and anti-Semitism outweighed
information provided by SIGINT alone.
The development of wireless communications in the early
1900 's influenced both communications in war-time and signals
intelligence. Radio promised, at least potentially, new
flexibility on the battlefield or at sea. Ships or units would
no longer be tied to the use of cables or visual signals and
communicating would be much quicker than in the past. Potential
limitations naturally existed concurrently with the advantages of
radio communications. Units utilizing radio would be vulnerable
to location through the previously mentioned technique of
direction finding. This weakness would be especially crucial at
sea if rival fleets attempted to surprise and engage each other
on the "ground" of their own choosing. Patterns in traffic
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volume could possibly alert an enemy to future intentions.
Finally, the actual information contained in the broadcasts could
be used by the enemy if he obtained the current cocebooks or
broke the cipher then in use. Thus, while radio offered swift
communications without the need of land or sea cables, the
message signals were available to anyone wishing to intercept
them.
If the Dreyfus Affair pointed out the potential for SIGINT,
World War I in large part realized that potential. The majority
of the belligerents utilized signals intelligence from one degree
to another with varying success. Of the three military
antagonists on the Western Front, France found herself the best
prepared to intercept and decode or decipher enemy messages.
Virtually overwhelmed during the initial German onslaught, the
French found time to work on many early intercepts once trench
warfare had settled in. These early messages enabled the French
to work up a somewhat crude profile of German strategic and
tactical tendencies in warmaking. Analyzing deciphered German
messages helped the French to understand "why the Germans made
the historic turn to the east that led to the crucial Battle of
the Marne,...and shed light on the thinking of German commanders
2 5
during the critical race to the sea." Appreciating these
cryptanalytic achievements, General Joffre, the
Commander-in-Chief, wrote the Minister of War: "I have, like all
the army commanders, during the last few days learned to realize
the value of the services which have been rendered by the
„26
cryptanalytic bureau of your department.
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The British military cryptanalyt ic bureau did not reach the
proficiency of the French but did perform valuable service.
Attached to the War Office, the British military intelligence
system resembled that of the French. Once in France, the British
established a field agency with the British Expeditionary Force,
while individuals were placed within the various field armies.
The most significant development in the field of signals
intelligence on either side during World War I was the organizing
of the British Naval Intelligence unit. Room 40, in 1914. Prior
to the war the Royal Navy had a single wireless station which
reported its message intercepts to Rear Admiral H.F. Oliver,
Director of the Intelligence Division. For the first two months
of the war the British essentially "muddled through" with signals
intelligence, following in their long tradition of just getting
by. The event that crystallized the signals intelligence effort
was the recovery of a number of German codebooks in late August
by the Russians. The light cruiser Magdeburg had run aground and
the appearance of two Russian cruisers rattled the German crew,
as a result the codebooks were not destroyed. In a spirit of
cooperation, the Russians offered copies of the books to the
British and they found their way into the hands of the 1st Lord
of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill.
Although by no means complete, the Magdeburg codebooks gave
the British a solid basis for decoding a number of German message
types. Later, in December, the British supplemented the
Magdeburg cache with books found by a trawler out fishing. In
the meantime, Oliver had persuaded Director of Naval Education
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Sir Alfred Ewing to organize the British codebreaking effort.
Ewing brought in a number of naval students and schoolmasters
from Dartmouth and Osborne naval colleges plus an ex-Foreign
Office member and, also the son of a Lord Chancellor. Overall,
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the group was well educated and somewhat of an elite.
In early November Churchill drafted Room 40 ' s charter.
Essentially Room 40 would decode and decipher intercepted German
messages and pass the translations on to Oliver, now Chief of
Staff. Churchill characteristically consolidated the
authorization to see and utilize the information in a very few
hands. Only four men—Churchill, Oliver, Admiral Fisher and
Admiral Wilson— were to have the "full" picture. They would
take the decodes and decripts of Room 40 and combine them with
any other information available. Neither Captain Reginald Hall,
the new Intelligence Division Director nor anyone else, including
Admiral of the Fleet John Jellicoe, knew what information was
available overall. The decision-makers desired secrecy above all
else and therefore did not solicit evaluations from anyone,
acting as intelligence analysts themselves and not always with
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favorable results.
Two episodes, the battles of the Dogger Bank and Jutland,
illustrated both the uses of Room 40 ' s SIGINT and its
limitations. In January 1915, through the monitoring of German
radio traffic the British became aware that Rear Admiral Franz
von Hipper had been ordered to take his battle cruisers out on a
reconnaissance of the Dogger Bank. More than two hours after
decoding the message, orders were sent to the various British
24
commanders to put to sea. Due to the delay in sending out the
orders there was not enough time for Jellicoe and the home fleet
to reach the engagement which left British fortunes in Beatty's
29hands alone.
In what became a running battle, Beatty's force pursued
Hipper 1 s force hoping to close and destroy it. At 10:54 U-boats
were reportedly spotted and Beatty ordered his force to turn at
right angles in evasive action. This slowed the British pursuit,
needlessly as it turned out. Two hours later Oliver signalled
the locations of the nearest U-boats, forty miles to the south
and thus out of the battle. Although Room 40 knew the location
of the U-boats, it had been up to Churchill and company to issue
any intelligence bulletins, and this one obviously came too
late.
Even after the U-boat scare, Beatty's force still had the
opportunity to savage Hipper ' s force. Unfortunately, Beatty's
flagship Lion dropped out of the battle and his signal, "Attack
the rear of the enemy, " was interpreted as an order to
concentrate on the damaged Bliicher As a result, the British
sank the helpless Bliicher and only damaged the Seydlitz and
Derf flinger , which escaped. Although they lost only one ship,
the psychological damage to the Germans resulted in their
attempting no major sorties for over a year. Frustration
characterized the British after Dogger Bank. Room 40 had
performed brilliantly but decisions taken after Room 40 '
s
intelligence came in undercut the British advantage. In this
instance, Room 40 ' s efforts were negated by faulty utilization of
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SIGINT and unfortunate events in battle.
The Battle of Jutland was perhaps the most famous naval
engagement of the First World War. Once again the Royal Navy had
the opportunity to cripple the High Seas Fleet and again Room 40
played a central role in the episode. Several occurrences in May
1916 indicated that the High Seas Fleet was preparing for a major
operation. In mid-May a number of U-boats put to sea, their
intended mission to scout and report British naval movements.
While generally ineffective at this, the fact that the U-boats
did not appear on the trade routes tipped Room 40 off that
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something unusual was going on.
Room 40 began picking up German wireless messages at the end
of May that also pointed to a major operation. On the 28th
Scheer ordered the fleet to a special state of readiness. The
next day he ordered the fleet to assemble in the outer Roads by
7:00 p.m. Another message informed the Admiral Commanding the
2nd Battle Squadron that prize crews were to be left behind on
this mission. Also, Room 40 had noted unusual activity by German
minesweepers and barrier breakers.
Room 40 passed its information up the chain of command,
leaving it up to Oliver to decide what information should be sent
to Jellicoe and what orders to give him. At 5:40 p.m., Jellicoe
put to sea in anticipation of a German sortie, Beatty's battle
cruisers set out from Rosyth a half hour later. Room 40 had
performed its mission, a German fleet sortie was expected and the
Royal Navy was preparing to meet it.
At this point Churchill and Oliver's original
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overcentralization of information began once again to take
effect. Later, Jellicoe stated that he been led to believe that
several new capital ships had been added to the High Seas Fleet
and would be opposing him. As it turned out, the exact
composition of the German fleet was known but not widely
disseminated. Thus, very basic information about the enemy
existed but had never been forwarded to the operational
commander
responsible for engaging the enemy. In addition, as instances of
this sort occurred, Jellicoe' s confidence in the Admiralty's
a 33intelligence service waned.
If information on the German order of battle was valuable
enough that Jellicoe would certainly have desired to have it,
then he quite as certainly would have preferred never to
have
received a message sent at 12:30 p.m. This message
gave "no
definite news of the enemy," but with directionals placed
the
German flagship in port at 11:10 a.m. According to this,
the
Germans were most likely still in their home port.
This message
was based on a rare visit by Captain Thomas Jackson,
Director of
Operations, who dropped by Room 40 to inquire as to
the location
of the transmitter using the call sign DK (Scheer's
call sign).
The Room 40 people informed Jackson that it was
located at
Wilhelmshaven. Unfortunately, Jackson simply strode out
of the
room without learning that Scheer had ordered
Wilhelmshaven to
use his call sign once the fleet began to put to
sea. The people
of Room 40 knew perfectly well that it was a
ruse to lead the
British into believing that Scheer was still in
port. As a
result of the message sent to him, Jellicoe maintained
an
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economical speed in order to conserve fuel, he did not wish
elements of the fleet to run low when the Germans put in their
appearance. This in turn meant that the Grand Fleet arrived on
the scene an hour or two later than necessary, thus leaving
Beatty's battle cruisers on their own and losing precious
daylight. To top off the situation, three hours after receiving
the message that the Germans were still in port, Beatty spotted
Hipper' s battle cruisers. This did little to enhance the
credibility of the Admiralty's intelligence for Beatty or
T ,-> • 34Jellicoe.
During the ensuing engagement, Hipper attempted to draw
Beatty's battle cruisers into the arms of the High Seas Fleet,
while Beatty hoped to ascertain whether Hipper was operating on
his own or with the German fleet. At 4:30 p.m. Beatty reversed
course to the north in order to draw the Germans into Jellicoe'
s
force. Since Scheer did not know that the Grand Fleet was at sea
he pursued Beatty. Taken by surprise at the appearance of the
Grand Fleet, Scheer then reversed course to disengage. Nightfall
prevented further action but Jellicoe placed his fleet between
Scheer and the German's home port in the hope of continuing the
battle the next day.
During the night another piece of intelligence that Jellicoe
did not possess possibly cost the British their victory. There
were four routes Scheer could take home and he decided on the
most direct one by way of Horns Reef Channel. Jellicoe concluded
that Scheer would probably take the route by Ems channel.
Unfortunately for Jellicoe, he had never been informed that Room
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's intercepts indicated that the Germans did not consider Ems
channel free of mines. This piece of information on its own
might not have placed the Germans in Jellicoe's grasp but
considering that none of the British commanders had any idea of
Scheer's whereabouts, Room 40 ' s intelligence would have been
welcome.
Jutland, like Dogger Bank, tantalized the British with the
possibility of destroying the High Seas Fleet, but like Dogger
Bank, left a sour taste in the mouths of the British. And what
of Room 40' s contributions to Jutland? The information provided
by Room 40 gave the British the opportunity to engage the German
fleet, but the results emphasized the fact -that signals
intelligence is not the omnipotent key to victory. Not all of
the available information was promptly sent to Jellicoe and some
never sent at all. One message received by Jellicoe at 10:23
p.m. simply stated the course and location of the rear German
battleship, it was not mentioned the source was a German
destroyer. Jellicoe believed the information inaccurate and
combined with the message that the Germans were still in port
destroyed his confidence in the intelligence sent him.
The system of overcentralization and excessive secrecy
devised by Churchill and administered by Oliver contained glaring
defects that reduced Room 40 ' s value. Of sixteen decodes passed
from Room 40 to the Operations, only three were sent to
Jellicoe. 37 Perhaps the main lesson to be drawn from Jutland,
and the Dogger Bank was that signals intelligence was only one
aspect of a process. Besides gathering information from various
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sources, it was necessary to analyze and eveluate it, alone and
combined into a whole, reach a conclusion and disseminate the
material. While it is certainly true that too many cooks can
spoil the broth, for the first two years of Room 40 ' s existence
too few cooks messed it up as well.
It should be remembered that Room 40 ' s situation was new and
mistakes were to be expected. Fortunately, changes were made.
Jellicoe became 1st Sea Lord after Jutland which helped to
decentralize things somewhat. Captain Hall received more
latitude in coordinating Room 40 ' s efforts with the rest of the
Intelligence Division. In fact, Hall became rather a James Bond
type, or at least Bond's superior. Not particularly concerned
with the morality of signals intelligence, Hall energetically
adopted "deception, disinformation, double-agents, bribery, and
black-mail." It was Hall who coordinated the revealing of the
Zimmerman Telegram in 1917 to the. United States in a tactful
manner that did not give away Room 40 ' s existence.
While Room 40 has not received the publicity or accolades of
the ULTRA or I1AGIC operations of World War II, the line of
continuity in signals intelligence certainly ran from Room 40,
through Yardley's Black Chamber in the 1920' s to ULTRA and MAGIC.
Although Room 40 had its share of dramatic intercepts such as
the Zimmerman Telegram, what signals intelligence generally came
down to was routine work, "Good intelligence depends, not on a
few brilliant coups, but on the patient study of an accumulation
of small, often dull and seemingly unimportant facts; on the
establishment of norms so that any deviation from the standard
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pattern of behavior immediately sets the alarm bells ringing for
38
the expert. "
Unlike the French and British, the Germans entered World War
I with no cryptanalytic service or analysts on the Western Front.
Even had such a unit existed there would have been little for it
to do early in the war. Since the French held the dubious
advantage of fighting on their own soil, they relied more on
their wire and cable network for communications. Not until 1916
did the French heavily utilize radio communications. As the war
progressed, the Germans recognized the potential opportunities
and organized the Abhorchdienst (Intercept Service) to monitor
Allied communications.
An example of signal intelligence's usefulness to the
Germans occurred later in 1916. Despite the protests of a
subordinate, a British major read his brigade's operations orders
in full over a field telephone. After sustaining significant
casualties in achieving their objective, the British discovered a
complete transcript of the orders reflecting German success at
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tapping into the British telephone lines.
Signal intelligence successes were not restricted to the
Western Front. In the east, due to a foul up in the distribution
of cipher keys, the Russians were forced to transmit "in the
clear" with no code and this contributed to the twin German
victories at Tannenberg and Masurian Lakes. Reading the Russian
transmits and combining the information with other intelligence
data, the German staff realized that the two advancing Russian
armies were uncoordinated. This allowed the Germans to screen
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one while concentrating and destroying the other. Thus, a
willingness to gamble plus a detailed picture of Russian
40
intentions resulted in German success.
What one writer described as "the single most far-reaching
and most important solution in history" occurred in January
1917. 41 Solved by the British Room 40 unit, the message became
known as the Zimmerman Telegram. Unable to break the war's
deadlock on land, the German officer corps advocated resuming
unrestricted submarine warfare, a move that quite probably would
bring the United States into the war. The German Foreign
Secretary hoped to offset this by proposing an alliance with
Mexico. For her part, Germany promised that Mexico would recover
the "lost territories of New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona."
Unknown to the Germans, Captain Hall of Room 40 was aware of
both routes used by the Germans to send messages to the Western
hemisphere. One was a circuitous route to Sweden, Buenos Aires,
and then to the German minister in Mexico by way of Washington.
The other ran from the American embassy in Berlin to Copenhagen,
London, and finally Washington. Originally, Colonel Edward House
had set this second route up to enable the Germans to communicate
directly with President Wilson. In this instance, however, the
Germans planned to use the cable system for purposes other than
peace initiatives.
The first decode of the Zimmerman Telegram was incomplete
due to the use of a new code, 0075, which left Hall with only an
idea of the telegram's contents. A possible solution occurred to
Hall. Although German Ambassador Bernstorff in Washington
32
possessed a copy of the new code, no other German diplomat in the
Western hemisphere did. Thus, in order to communicate with them
Bernstorff would have to use the old 13040 code, broken by Room
40 in 1915. Fortunately for Hall, the British Charge d'Affaires
in Mexico City, Tom Hohler, knew two English brothers living
there. One, a printer, had run afoul of the Carranza government
and the second brother had approached Hohler for help. Hohler
was able to get the brother released and the two promised to help
Hohler in any way they could. As it turned out, the second
brother worked in the Telegraph service and thus, Hall had access
through Hohler to any messages coming into Mexico City. Since
telegrams coming into the city were sent in the old code, Hall
had a decoded copy of Zimmerman's instructions by Fegruary 19,
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one month after its original dispatch.
Hall then began working with Edward Bell, Secretary of the
US Embassy and US Ambassador Walter Hines Page. With permission
from Prime Minister Balfour, Hall coordinated the giving of the
telegram's information to the Americans, who then brought in
American security agencies to make it appear that the United
States had discovered and exposed the telegram. This protected
the secret of Room 40 ' s existence while at the same time bringing
the German plot to President Wilson's attention. Page and Bell
both believed Germany to be a threat to the world order and that
she must be defeated, and so were pleased that the incident would
bring the United States closer to belligerency on the side of the
Allies. Once made public, the telegram influenced the American
public's desire to enter the war and played a significant part in
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the decision to assist the Allies in defeating the Central
43
Powers.
Prior to her entry into World War I, America's efforts in
cryptanalysis were erratic. In Geneva, Illinois, a private
cryptanalytic unit funded by one George Fabyan worked on codes
and ciphers forwarded from the War, Navy, State, and Justice
Departments.
44 Temporarily directed by William F. Friedman,
the Riverbank Laboratories operated until 1919. Generally
working parallel to the cryptanalytic unit set by the War
Department in 1917, Riverbank occasionally disagreed with the
military unit over the methods of solving codes and the
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usefulness of enciphering machines.
At this time the future head of the American Black Chamber
was working as a code clerk in the State Department. Herbert 0.
Yardley had been born in a small Indiana town in 1889. An
average student in school, Yardley did well in mathematics and
was busy with school related activities such as editing the
school paper, captain of the football team and president of his
class. Yardley was popular and enjoyed taking charge of
activities that he involved himself in. Although he wanted to
become a criminal lawyer, he instead found himself working as a
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clerk in the State Department.
A romantic with a desire for action rather than the routine,
it was probably too much to expect Yardley to simply pass the
time playing solitaire or reading. One night Yardley decided to
tackle the code used by President Wilson and Colonel House.
Expecting a difficult challenge, Yardley solved it in a few hours
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and picked up what became known as the "Yardley symptom. " "It
(cryptanalysis) was the first thing I thought of when I awakened,
,47
the last when I fell asleep.
'While Yardley passed his time in the State Department code
room, the American military found itself in need of an effective
cryptanalytic service to handle the requirements of warfare. The
possibility of full-time work with codes and ciphers certainly
appealed to Yardley and he presented himself to Major Ralph Van
Deman, later called the Father of American Intelligence.
Impressed with Yardley' s skills, Van Deman commissioned Yardley a
lieutenant and made him head of the new cryptologic section of
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the Military Intelligence Division, MI-3.
The unit grew rapidly and as with their British
counterpart, Room 40, much of the staff consisted of university
professors and instructors holding Ph.D.'s. Dr. John Manly
headed the Department of English at the University of Chicago and
became Yardley' s chief assistant. Others from Chicago included
David H. Stevens, instructor in English; Thomas A. Knott,
associate professor of English; and Charles H. Beeson, associate
professor of Latin. Later achievements of the various staff
members included directing the division of humanities of the
Rockefeller Foundation and the editing of Webster's Dictionary .
Yardley and his more middle class, non-academic background made
an interesting contrast to the more elite staff of the Black
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Chamber.
Laboring diligently throughout the war, MI-8 worked at
various aspects of signals intelligence such as discovering
35
secret ink messages in letters and deciphering them. One such
message revealed a plot to smuggle explosives for sabotage within
the hollow figures of saints and the Virgin Mary. Manly
personally solved a cipher designating Lothar Witzke, alias Pablo
Waberski as a German agent. Although the agent was sentenced to
death, this was commuted to life imprisonment and he was released
in 1923.
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Yardley visited Great Britain and France in 1918, hoping to
learn from their four years of experience. He did observe
MI-I(b), studying how the British Military Cipher Bureau attacked
codes and ciphers. Although he found MI-I(b) helpful, Yardley
made no headway in gaining entrance to now Admiral Hall's Room
40. It is not surprising that Yardley had little success with
Hall. 52 Edward Bell maintained an excellent relationship with
Hall through genuine friendship and discretion about Hall's
activities, yet he certainly did not know all of the details
about Room 40 and there was really no reason why Hall should
fling open the doors to Room 40 for the rather pushy Yardley.
This was particularly true in light of the fact that Yardley had
nothing to "trade" with Hall. To give away secrets gained
through years of hard work without something tangible in return
simply made no sense to Hall.
Yardley did little better on his visit to France. He did
meet the famous Captain Georges Painvin, possibly the greatest
cryptanalyst of the war. Once convinced that Yardley understood
cryptology, Painvin opened his files and allowed Yardley to study
with him. As for the French Diplomatic Cipher Bureau, like Room
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40, it remained closed to Yardley. Yardley pulled what strings
he could and discussed the situation with US Ambassador Sharp,
Major Warburton, the Military Attache, and Colonel Van Deman.
Still, France's own Black Chamber remained closed to Yardley and
its very existence or location denied by many in the French
<.
54government.
Once the war ended, Yardley faced returning to the State
Department. Using his salesmanship, Yardley convinced the State
and War Departments to finance jointly a permanent cryptanalytic
bureau. In May 1919, Army Chief of Staff Peyton C. March and
Frank L. Polk, acting Secretary of State, approved Yardley'
s
plan. Of the recommended $100,000 budget, $40,000 was to come
from the State Department and $60,000 from funds allocated for
"Contingency Military Intelligence Division" and not subject to
review by the Comptroller General. " The budget broke down as
follows: rent, light, and heat— $3900; reference books— $100;
Yardley' s salary— $6000; ten code and cipher experts
—
$30,000; 15
code and cipher experts
—
$30,000; twenty-five clerks— $30,000, a
total of $100, 000. 56
Since the State Department funds could not legally be spent
within the District of Columbia, the unit moved to New York City.
Here, out of the State and War Department's need for information
was born the Black Chamber. The State Department in particular
valued the Chamber's efforts, and when the War Department's share
of the FY 1921 budget was cut to $10,000, the State Department
maintained its level at $40,000. According to Friedman, with
United States at peace, the Chamber's work mainly interested the
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State Department, and the majority of the funding this came from
57
there.
After the war, friction between the United States and Japan
grew, and one of Yardley's primary assignments was to break the
Japanese diplomatic codes. The task required the remainder of
1919, but by February of 1920 the first translations of Japanese
cables arrived by courier in Washington. Arthur Bliss Lane, a
Foreign Service officer and liaison from the State Department to
53 „
the Chamber may have arranged the courier service. From then
on the Chamber deciphered diplomatic messages from various
nations for an appreciative State Department.
Although perhaps not taken for granted as it is today,
intelligence work was an accepted and expected part of the
decision-making process in the 1920's. Besides cryptanalytic
reports, G-2, the Chamber's parent organization, issued daily and
weekly summaries of military, diplomatic, political, social, and
economic events from around the world. These summaries
circulated throughout the War and State Departments and the White
House.
59 During the period immdiately after the war the Navy
continued to rely heavily on the British Admiralty's Room 40.
The Navy did maintain the Code and Signal Section created in
1917-1918, and during the 1920's it assumed many functions
60
similar to those of the Black Chamber.
The Chamber's role before and during the Washington
Conference was that of an information provider to aid in the
making of decisions and the formulation of plans. The value and
use of the Chamber's information depended upon the individuals
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receiving the information and their system for processing it.
Data furnished before the conference convened may have aided in
the preparation of the American position with subsequent
information reinforcing that position. The majority of the
information provided by the Chamber was of the routine sort that
shocks no one but over time fills in the picture of the other
party's capabilities and possible intentions. In such a case,
little hard evidence would exist that SIGINT influenced the
situation when in fact its role was of considerable importance.
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Chapter III. SIGINT Before and During the Conference
:msThe major powers had discussed the possibility of an arr
limitation conference since the end of World War I. Since many
of the proposals had elicited negative responses from the United
States, both the Japanese and British believed that the United
States would have to originate and host a conference; otherwise
she would not attend.
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By the summer of 1921, the United
States had concluded that a conference to limit armaments would
be in its interests. Secretary of State Hughes issued informal
invitations to Britain and Japan in early July 1921, hoping to
gain the initiative with respect to conference proposals.
After Britain and Japan responded favorably to the proposal,
Hughes busied himself with obtaining the information necessary to
formulate the American position and safeguard American interests.
This information came from a variety of sources, including the
Black Chamber. The Chamber supplied the bulk of its
preconference intercepts during the month of July. A July 4
cable from Baron Hayashi Gonsuhe, Ambassador to London, commented
upon the disagreement in British circles over continuing the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
62 According to Lord Curzon, British
Foreigh Secretary, there was no need to hurry in resolving the
question; in order to insure peace and stability in the Far East,
the alliance would remain in force after the July 13 expiration
date. Some British believed the circumstances that had created
the alliance had changed and questioned the alliance's necessity.
No longer concerned over India's safety, they wished to explore
40
other possibilities for insuring peace in the Pacific and Far
East. In this cable, Curzon casually proposed holding a Pacific
conference in the United States. It was this proposal, made
public in the House of Commons on July 7, that prompted Hughes to
seek the initiative in the calling of the armaments
63
conference.
Immediately after informal invitations were issued, the
Chamber deciphered cables indicating two obstacles to be overcome
before the conference would take place. In cables to the home
government in Tokyo, Ambassador Hayashi advised accepting the
64invitation and worrying about the conference agenda later.
Whether to accept the invitation first or to determine if the
agenda would be limited to armaments only or possibly include
broader Pacific and Far East issues preoccupied the Japanese
throughout July. Lord Curzon further complicated matters when he
inquired about holding a preliminary meeting in London to discuss
the Pacific and Far East questions and possibly set the agenda
for the main armaments conference. The two obstacles then
were to settle the agenda issue and deal with the unexpected
suggestion of a preliminary meeting in London.
For Tokyo, whether to attend the conference and the scope of
the agenda became intertwined. The Japanese ambassador to Paris
cabled Tokyo on July 11, arguing that it would be dangerous to
accept the invitation blindly without any concrete idea of the
agenda. Still, since the Japanese public seemed to support
armament reduction, the ambassador thought it a good opportunity
to "do away with the militaristic element in our foreign
41
policy." Officials in Tokyo told the American Charge
d 'Affaires Edward Bell that they would agree to deal with
armaments limitation or reduction, but they must know the scope
of the other topics before they commit their government to the
conference. Bell in turn relayed to the Japanese that the United
States wished to combine arms reduction and Pacific and Far East
policy into one conference. This put the United States at odds
with Great Britain and left the Japanese unsure of what course of
6 7
action to take.
By the third week of July, the situation had polarized, with
the United States desiring one conference in Washington to deal
with armaments and any relevant Pacific and Far East issues. In
contrast, Lord Curzon proposed a preliminary meeting in London
during August which the Dominion premiers could attend. Due to
the peculiarities of diplomatic intercourse, neither nation had
made its position completely clear nor asked for a definite yes
or no answer to its proposal.
This situation left Japan in the middle and somewhat
confused. The Japanese considered armaments limitation and the
Pacific issues as two different subjects, not to be combined at
one meeting. On the other hand, Japan had not expected to be in
the position of the possible swing vote on the issue of one
conference or two, and possibly alienate either Britain or the
68United States. On July 14, Ambassador Hayashi in London
asked the home government if it knew the agenda. 69 The next
day Tokyo cabled London inquiring if the United States objected
to a conference in London. ' On the 21st, Hayashi informed
42
Tokyo that Lord Curzon desired a preliminary conference in
London, and suggested that Japan should make it clear if she
supported either the United States or London for the site!
The Black Chamber continued to keep Hughes informed as the
situation developed. By following the course of events through
the intercepts and his own communications, Hughes concluded that
Japan was not really concerned over the preliminary meeting and
was not working with Britain against the United States. At the
end of July, Tokyo cabled its London ambassador that it felt
caught in the middle over the Pacific conference Question. Tokyo
then indicated its concern with the nature of the preliminary
meeting, which, according to Lord Curzon, would create guarantees
parallel to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to assure peace in the
72
region.
In addition to deciphering cables that reassured Hughes that
Japan and Britain were not in league against him, the Chamber
furnished intelligence which disclosed that the ambassadors were
pressuring Japan to attend the conference. As a new
international power, Japan was sensitive to world public opinion
and criticism by the established powers. The Japanese believed
that their recent problems in the Pacific and Far East, such as
with China, had been "overly magnified" and that Japan had been
made the "goat" for all problems in the region. " On the 13th,
Ambassador Hayashi sent two cables to Tokyo recommending
acceptance and that Japan should respond to world public opinion,
for too long a delay would result in speculations and suspicions
of Japan's good intentions.
74 From Washington, Baron Shidehara
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Kijuro informed Tokyo that Britain had prematurely announced that
discussions about a Pacific meeting were underway and that Hughes
had decided to combine the broad topic of Pacific and Far East
policy with armaments. Shidehara then pointed out that Japan was
the only power that had not yet accepted its invitation to the
conference and that it must be careful not to create the
impression of blocking the conference.
The issue of a preliminary conference persisted until
mid-August. Hughes maintained that one conference in Washington
would serve everyone's purpose more effectively than adding a
supposedly "informal" meeting to discuss the agenda and Pacific
and Far East policy. As the conference host, Hughes had only to
wait on the British decision. Since Britain had already accepted
the invitation to Washington, Lord Curzon had little choice but
to give up on his preliminary meeting. Curzon then declared the
whole agenda and conference to be America's responsibility and
would have nothing more to do with defining them.
In the last week of July and then again in September, the
Black Chamber deciphered several cables which indicated the
general approach of Japan in reference to the conference agenda.
In the last week of July and then again in September, the
Black Chamber deciphered several cables which indicated the
general approach of Japan in reference to the conference agenda.
In a cable to Ambassador Shidehara in Washington, Tokyo outlined
a policy strategy. Concerning the Pacific and Far East
questions, Japan wanted to take the initiative and introduce some
of the issues such as the Open Door and equal commercial
44
the Shantung peninsula from Germany during World War I and her
continued control of the region was one of the compromises
President Wilson reluctantly made at the Paris Peace Conference.
Now, two years later, not everyone was content that Japan still
occupied Shantung and Japan was sensitive about the issue. If
the broader question of China arose, the delegation was to point
out the liberal policy that Japan had formulated with respect to
China in December, 1918, which included: a) abolishing
exterritoriality b) abolishing spheres of influence c) the
withdrawal of foreign troops and d) ending the Boxer
indemnity.
Japanese ambassadors sent several other suggestions to Tokyo
in July. The ambassador in Paris favored the abolishing of
spheres of influence as stipulated in Japan's China policy on the
grounds that the Open Door would favor Japanese economic
penetration into areas presently closed to her. From London,
Ambassador Hayashi recommended that Japan handle Chinese issues
directly with China and not submit them to a conference as China
desired. Hayashi also passed on Under Secretary Crowe's comments
that the purpose of a Pacific conference would be to reach
, .. 78
general agreements which would insure peace in the Pacific.
In September, Tokyo finally received some hard data on the
agenda. In a discussion with Ambassador Shidehara, Hughes
suggested a number of topics including the territorial integrity
of China, the Open Door, railroads in China, and League mandates.
The topics were indeed broad, with Hughes even proposing the
powers deal with the Chinese Eastern Railway, which belonged to
45
the Soviet Union! According to Hughes, the powers could act as
trustees until a "lawful" government was set up in Russia.
Shidehara acknowledged to Tokyo that it would be difficult to
prevent specific topics from being brought up when the agenda
covered so much, but "accomplished facts, " as he put it, could be
defended. He therefore recommended that Japan be fair but firm
when her interests were at stake.
As the convening of the conference approached, Hughes
received two final pieces of information in October. According
to a military intelligence summary, Japan's chief objective at
the conference would be the non-fortification of Pacific
possessions. Guam must not be fortified; and Hawaii, the
Philippines, and the Panama Canal must be de-fortified.
Apparently, this was part of a grand strategy which placed
non-fortification as a higher priority than fleet ratios and
dove-tailed with the information provided by the Black
M. V. 80Chamber.
The Black Chamber's final piece of intelligence related to
armaments and fortifications. On October 20, Tokyo cabled the
Japanese delegation in Washington their opening position. They
were to inform their counterparts that Japan might be willing to
modify the size of her army and navy, both present and building.
To do so, it would be necessary for Japan to maintain her "proper
ratio" with the United States and Britain and for the status of
81
the Pacific region to remain substantially unchanged.
Hughes incorporated this information plus ideas of his own
and that of colleagues into the decision-making process. The US
46
delegation was well aware of its Navy's wish to keep a large
fleet and to fortify America's Pacific possessions. Secretary of
War Elihu Root inquired about the possibility of Congress
appropriating the required funds for the Navy's plans. Senators
Henry Cabot Lodge and Oscar Underwood informed Root that there
82
was no chance Congress would fund the Navy's proposals.
Thus, the shortage of military appropriations might force the
United States to work to maintain the status quo in the Pacific;
otherwise any building by other powers would leave the United
States at a disadvantage. Japan also favored maintaining the
status quo in the Pacific. Due to her close proximity to the
various Pacific possessions, Japan could more quickly move her
naval and military forces to a specific area than could the
United States or Great Britain. If the naval and fortifications
status quo were maintained, then Japan would save a great deal of
money while preserving her geographic advantage for concentrating
naval and military forces. Since as much as one-third of Japan's
national budget was going into naval construction, the savings
were potentially substantial and could be used in other sectors
83
of the economy.
Hughes did receive information before the conference that
contrasted with that of the Black Chamber, military intelligence
and congressional leaders. In July, Secretary of the Navy Edwin
Denby requested that the General Board of the Navy prepare a
study on the limitation of armaments to provide Hughes with the
Navy's analysis of the situation. The Board's study advocated a
stronger navy and continued fortifying of US outposts in the
47
Pacific. Reflecting a distinctly social Darwinistic outlook, the
Board stated: "All life is a constant struggle for existence,
not only for life but existence on a higher plane." To be
successful in its struggle, the Board recommended a world class
navy with a 2:1 naval ratio to Japan to offset her geographic
advantage. Also, the Board strongly argued against the razing of
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American fortifications in Manila, Oahu, and Guam. Set
against congressional refusals to provide the necessary
expenditures, signals intelligence decrypts that Japan would
reduce armaments, and Hughes' own desire for concrete results at
the conference, the General Board gave ground. Although it
provided information for Hughes to utilize in formulating policy,
the General Board's views were ultimately not adhered to.
After studying the situation prior to the conference, Hughes
concluded that the naval ratio should be established on a "stop
now, as is" basis. He believed that if each power bargained on
the basis of its own specific needs, the negotiations would
85
result in an endless round of escalating requirements.
Still, Hughes maintained that the United States must build up to
86
treaty limits to insure her relative naval strength. Later,
Hughes concluded that nonfulfillment of these limits resulted in
future conference failures such as London in 1930.
By the time the Washington Conference convened on "Tovember
13, a great deal of information had been provided to Secretary
Hughes and the American delegation from various sources, not the
least of which was the Black Chamber. The majority of the
deciphered cables had dealt with three subjects: first, Japanese
48
concern over the imminent expiration of the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance; second, the confusion over the agenda, preliminary
meeting and whether Japan should accept her invitation; and
third, what Japanese policy was likely to be once the conference
opened.
Japan's concern over the Anglo-Japanese Alliance assumed
potential significance since it coincided with a high probability
that the US Congress would not appropriate the money required to
enlarge greatly the US Navy, nor construct the desired
fortifications on America's possessions. The problem of fiscal
cutbacks meant that for practical purposes Hughes would need to
maintain the status quo in the Pacific or the United States would
possibly become strategically vulnerable. The British desire to
re-evaluate and replace the Anglo-Japanese Alliance left Japan
with the choice of preserving the status quo in the Pacific or of
spending vast sums to insure Japan's strategic security. Being
aware of both the American and Japanese situations allowed Hughes
to concentrate on the naval ratio issue, which he deemed vital,
and to use the non-fortification issue for bargaining purposes if
necessary.
Reading the series of decrypts provided by the Chamber about
the agenda and preliminary meeting issue supplied Hughes with
several pieces of useful information. First, the confusion in
Tokyo and among the various ambassadors strongly implied that
Japan and Britain were not coordinating their positions for the
conference, which had been a genuine concern of Hughes. In fact,
it was clear that Japan cared little about the preliminary
49
meeting issue, wishing only to avoid taking sides and to obtain
some idea of what the agenda would include. Hughes' awareness of
Japan's indifference to a preliminary meeting made it easier for
him to resist such British proposals. Secretary Hughes had
simply to recommend combining the Pacific and Far East issues
with the armaments conference and remain firm. This required
Britain to accept the invitation "as is" or place herself in the
awkward position of holding out for a preliminary meeting.
The Japanese cables dealing with conference policy revolved
mainly around China, the Pacif ic, and how to deal with undesired
topics. It was not until the final cable on October 20 that
Tokyo discussed the armaments aspect of the conference and even
then it shared attention with the strategic situation in the
Pacific. Apparently, Japan's principal concerns were of a grand
strategic nature and related to geography and regions. On the
other hand, the centerpiece of the conference to Hughes was the
naval limitations issue. The near certainty that Congress would
not provide the funds for a strategic build-up in the Pacific
left Hughes little choice but to concentrate on the naval ratio.
The SIGINT decrypts' indication that Japan was preoccupied with
China and the Pacific meant that Hughes could, if he chose, use
the status quo in the Pacific as a tool to achieve naval
limitations.
When Hughes opened the conference on November 13, 1921, he
immediately took the initiative and made a specific proposal for
naval reductions along with the customary welcome to the
delegates. Hughes' opening statement reflected both his personal
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views on disarmament, and also the various information
he had
received from intelligence services and collegues
indicating that
domestic and world opinion welcomed the possibility
of
significant reductions of military and naval armament.
Hughes'
proposal contained a "naval holiday" which would
stop
construction and place a ten-year moratorium on the
building of
capital ships. He then described a plan to
reduce the existing
fleets based upon their current size with
the United States
scrapping thirty ships, Great Britain twenty-three
and Japan
twenty-five. The result would be a ratio of 10=10:6,
roughly the
same as before the reductions. The scope
of the plan surprised
most of the delegates, who expected the
typical opening speech of
welcome and generalities. In fact, the
Japanese had not
even established guidelines for naval
ratios by the opening of
the conference.
87 As one commentator put it, "Hughes sank
in
thirty-five minutes more ships than all the
admirals of the world
have sunk in a cycle of centuries."
88 At a press reception
later that day, Baron Kato joined in the spirit of
the conference
by pointing out that Japan's naval
program was defensive and that
she did not wish to challenge or rival
the American or British
89
navies.
Although Hughes also brought up the subject of Pacific
and
Far East questions in his opening speech
and recommended parallel
discussions, his main interest appeared to
the Japanese to lie
with armaments reduction. Accordingly,
Baron Kato attended the
meetings on armaments reduction and Baron
Shidehara those
j i .,« ,,iHi papifir and Par East issues,
meetings dealing with f c r c qjju
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The Black Chamber continued to monitor the Japanese
diplomatic communications. The day after the conference opened,
Ambassador Hayashi in London cabled Tokyo his reactions to
Hughes' opening speech. While stating that there existed room
for changes in detail, Hayashi voiced general approval for the
plan. He advocated using the money saved for internal
improvements and argued the urgency of changing the present
policy from military preparations to one of national
90development.
On the 16th a cable from the Japanese delegation in
Washington to the home government contained what was evidently
the delegation's middle plan in response to Hughes' opening
proposal. This plan included a 10:7 ratio for American-Japanese
naval strength and an equality in aircraft carriers. Also, the
delegation made it clear that there might be further changes in
91
the future, dependent upon the results of the negotiations.
It is significant to note that the Japanese desire for a 10:7
ratio originated in Washington rather than Tokyo. Thus, this
condition does not appear to have been a preconceived and
integral part of Japanese defense policy, fixed and
nonnegoti able
.
Within days of the opening session, the Japanese delegation
wavered somewhat on the ratio issue. When members of the
Japanese press corps expressed reservations about Japan's
insistence on a 10:7 ratio, Baron Kato called a special news
conference for the afternoon of the 17th. There he insisted upon
the absolute necessity for the 10:7 ratio to safeguard Japanese
52
national defense. In contrast to this statement, Kato called a
second press meeting a few hours later where he then stated that
Japan should maintain a naval ratio of "slightly greater than
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sixty per cent. What occurred in those intervening hours is
not clear as the surviving records of the Black Chamber hold no
evidence of instructions from Tokyo. Since the cable informing
Tokyo of the delegation's desire for a 10 : 7 ratio had been sent
only the day before, it is unlikely that the home government
would have immediately responded with instructions for the
delegation to lower their' demand. It seems more plausible that
Baron Kato acted on his own or with the delegation's approval in
modifying the desired ratio. The original 10:7 ratio demand had
originated in Washington, and, at the time, the delegation had
informed Tokyo that it might be necessary to make changes and
amendments to the Japanese position.
Further evidence that the Japanese delegation modified its
own 10:7 ratio was contained in a cable from Tokyo to Washington
on the 19th. In it the home government stated that to attain the
10:7 ratio the United States need not scrap more ships but allow
Japan to retain the Mutsu and Aki . The home government hoped the
instructions in this cable would be the final basis of the ratio
agreement. Indeed, Tokyo included three variations of this plan
for negotiating purposes, with ratios ranging from 10:7.5 to
10:7. This occurred after Kato's press comment about a ratio of
93
"slightly greater than sixty per cent."
Using these early decripts Hughes might have reached two
conclusions: first, that the 10:7 ratio counterproposal
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originated with the Japanese delegation and not the home
government; and second, that the modification of the 10:7 demand
by Baron Kato also originated in Washington. From this Hughes
may further have concluded that the Japanese delegation's views
would carry a great deal of weight with Tokyo and that pressure
brought to bear on the delegation could pay dividends in the
long-run. Further decripts from the Chamber would help confirm
whether the Japanese were indeed inclined to be flexible and
compromise.
In addition to the Black Chamber's decripts, Hughes was also
receiving reports from Ambassador Warren in Tokyo. On November
17 Warren talked with Prime Minister Takahashi, who indicated
that the Japanese government was satisfied with the naval
94proportion, with "slight modifications." On the 19th Warren
reported that the Japanese Cabinet had no problems with the arms
95proposals and intended to leave the details to Baron Kato.
Summing up the situation as of the 23rd, Warren concluded that
there was no reason for making great concessions to Kato. The
Japanese government strongly desired an agreement, and Warren did
not expect them to support Kato should he take an "extreme"
. . 96
. .position. Warren s information coincided with that of the
Chamber: thus far, Japanese policy had originated in Washington
and Hughes should concentrate his attention on the Japanese
delegation.
Hughes responded to Warren on November 27. In his view, the
Japanese could not justify their 10:7 ratio demand with facts.
The American position was both fair and accurate. It reflected
54
the naval balance as it then existed and to tamper with Hughes'
opening proposal would only arouse American public opinion
against Japan. Thus, Hughes intended to stand by his original
proposal.
Two cables, dated 21 and 2 2 November reported to Tokyo
Hughes' response to Japan's desire to raise Hughes' original
ratio to 10:7. According to one report, Hughes stated to
American and foreign correspondents that his ratio proposal gave
fair representation to all three powers and that the United
States resisted any change. Other news stories emphasized that
Britain supported the American proposal and that Japan would
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ultimately have to agree to the 10:6 ratio. The delegation
also stated that the American press had adopted a generally
positive tone about the conference's outcome due to the
perception that Japan did not have a strong bargaining position
and would yield on disputed points.
On November 28 the Chamber intercepted a cable from Tokyo
containing instructions to the delegation for negotiating the
naval ratio. The home government made it clear that the
delegation must avoid any "clash" with the United States and
Great Britain on the issue and that the delegation should adopt a
moderate attitude in achieving the Japanese objective of a 10:7
ratio. If necessary, the delegation could fall back upon its
proposed 10:6.5 ratio. Should agreement still elude them, the
delegation could then move to the third plan of a 10:6 ratio with
the Mutsu substituted for the Settsu , an older ship, and an
agreement which would reduce fortifications or maintain the
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status quo of the Pacific defenses. Tokyo desired that plan
number four (Hughes' original 10:6 ratio) be avoided if
99possible.
A November 28 cable to Tokyo dealt with American public
opinion, with the delegates reporting a generally optimistic
belief in the United States that a compromise would be reached.
In order to maintain the goodwill of the American press and
public, the delegation strongly requested that the home
government prevent Japanese domestic opinion from running to
100
extremes
.
The significance of the November 28 cable from Tokyo lay in
its outlining of Japanese negotiating plans which Hughes could
study. Also, it introduced the possibility of tying the ratio
question to the Pacific defenses issue as a way to reach an
agreement. The knowledge that the Japanese public opinion might
be government directed to a large extent undercut its usefulness
to the Japanese negotiating position. Whether Hughes seriously
concerned himself over Japanese domestic opinion is unclear, but
this information could have led him to discount it even further.
Warren again reported to Hughes on November 30, pointing out
that a Japanese newspaper demand for the 10:7 ratio evidently
originated in Washington under direction of the Japanese
delegation. They had hoped the press coverage would strengthen
their bargaining position. Warren then stated that the demand
..
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did not seem to have strong support in the government.
Coming on the heels of Tokyo's orders to avoid a "clash" with the
United States and Britain, the newspaper demand appeared to have
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been an effort by the delegation to create outside support for
their position. This would avoid the appearance of stubborn
intransigence on their part. Unfortunately for the delegation,
the effectiveness of such a move was undercut by the information
Hughes received from the Chamber and Ambassador Warren.
The issue of the Japanese 10:7 ratio amendment versus
Hughes' 10:6 ratio continued into December. Baron Kato voiced
some unease over the deadlock in a cable to Tokyo on December 1.
He first pointed out that, in contrast to Japanese public
opinion, the American delegation had relegated Far East questions
to a secondary position and had concentrated on naval reductions.
Despite Japan's continued desire for a 10:7 ratio, the American
public still maintained a friendly attitude toward Japan. Kato
believed this reflected the conclusion that Japan would
ultimately accept the Anglo-American position. Significantly,
Kato pointed out that should American and British opinion turn
against Japan and "adopt a policy of exerting pressure upon us, "
the conference would probably fail. Such a failure would then
result in a naval race in which the Japanese navy weald be
reduced below the sixty percent ratio they now opposed. This
potential outcome would be worse than any of the possibilities
discussed at the conference and the likelihood that there would
be no Anglo-Japanese Alliance or a status quo agreement for the
102
Pacific compounded the problem.
Baron Kato sent a cable to Tokyo on December 2 in which he
recounted his interview with Lord Balfour. At the meeting Kato
informed Lord Balfour of the importance of the 10:7 ratio and the
57
retaining of the Mutsu to Japan and the difficulty of abandoning
this position. Lord Balfour evidently feared that the conference
might founder on the ratio issue but had little constructive to
add. Kato then informed Tokyo of the delegation's difficulty in
maintaining its stand and feared that a deadlock on this issue
could result in a negative perception of Japan which would spread
to other issues under negotiation. He concluded with the comment
that Hughes had shown interest in the Pacific defenses question.
That the naval ratio and the status of the Pacific would be tied
together in order to reach a general agreement now became more
likely.
In a second cable that day, Kato relayed to Tokyo that the
American press now criticized Japan's 10:7 ratio amendment. The
press stories indicated a belief that Japan was stalling on the
ratio in order to gain concessions on Far East issues.
Significantly, Kato also mentioned that it was conjectured by the
press that Japan wished to link the naval ratio to the "abolition
..103
of various Pacific island fortifications.
As is often the case, the press speculations were not far
from the truth. At a meeting with Lord Balfour on December 1,
Baron Kato indicated the importance Japan attached to rumors that
America was spending vast sums in the Philippines and Guam. The
Japanese people interpreted these reports "as an American menace"
which made it difficult for Baron Kato to consider the naval
ratio and Pacific fortifications separately. Balfour then asked
if an understanding on the Pacific defenses question might serve
as an explanation to the Japanese people about the 10:6 naval
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ratio agreement. Kato replied that such an understanding would
help and approved Lord Balfour's informing Secretary Hughes of
the conversation. However loosely and informally, the naval
104
ratio and the Pacific defenses had been linked.
A meeting between Hughes, Kato, and Balfour on December 2
clearly pointed out the value of SIGINT in conjunction with
Warren's reports from Tokyo. At the meeting Kato stated that
Japan sincerely desired an agreement to reduce and limit naval
armaments. This was evidenced by his statement in March 1921
that Japan might give up part of her 8-8 naval program. He then
stated that the 10:6 ratio was not satisfactory, and that he
supported his technical experts' views that the 10:7 ratio,
originated in Tokyo, was necessary for Japanese security, and
that the Japanese Government and Parliament supported this
position. 105 While it may have been true that the Japanese
government desired the 10:7 ratio, Hughes was well aware that the
proposed amendment had not originated in Tokyo, nor was the home
government giving Kato carte blanche support, as his comments
implied. Hughes' reading of the Chamber's decripts and Warren's
reports certainly made it easier for him to evaluate the Japanese
negotiating position and to conclude how much stock to place in
Kato's comments. Hughes wanted to keep the 10:6 ratio as part of
his overall naval limitation program and evidence slowly began to
amass that he could achieve his ratio by using the status quo of
the Pacific defenses as a bargaining chip. The great advantage
in this was that the United States would not build extensive
Pacific fortifications at the time, thus maintaining the status
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quo of the region would suit Hughes perfectly.
Interest by the powers in using the Pacific defenses issue
as a lever to reach a general agreement continued. A few days
after the Kato-Balfour meeting, the Black Chamber deciphered a
cable from Tokyo with further instructions for reaching an
agreement based upon the status quo. In this cable, the Japanese
government made clear that the home territories of the signatory
powers must not be included. Since none of the three powers
wished to open their home territories to claims that might
jeopardize their security, it was desirable to specifically
106
exclude home territories.
The Japanese delegation received a cable the following day
from Tokyo responding to the delegation's concerns of November 28
and December 1 about Japanese public opinion. This cable clearly
stated that the national government had attempted to guide the
course of public opinion away from extremes as requested. To
support the delegation's advocacy of the 10:7 ratio the
government believed it necessary that the people favor this
position and so "cooperated with the ministry of the navy and
guided certain suitable Japanese newspapers and foreign
correspondents." Tokyo then stated that it would not be able to
control public opinion and the media much longer. Should it
continue to appear that Japan would concede on the 10:6 ratio,
the government anticipated a rise in the nationalist party and
among active and retired military organizations that rejected the
. . 107
ratio.
The delegations spent the first week of December slowly
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exploring the possibility of combining the naval ratio and the
question of the Pacific status quo into one agreement. Warren
and Hughes exchanged cables that charted the course of events.
According to Warren, the Japanese Government had begun
preparations to inform the Japanese public that the naval ratio
was but one part of the fundamental agreement on Pacific and Far
East issues. Also to be included were the Anglo-Japanese
108Alliance and Pacific fortifications. Hughes described the
general situation in Washington to Warren, elaborating on his
view that there were differences between fortifications. The
home islands of Japan, Hawaii, Australia, and New Zealand
contained defensive fortifications, while the Philippines and
Guam, plus their British and Japanese counterparts were offensive
109in nature and could be limited. Warren then followed with
cables on the 7th and 10th. In these, he stated that Uchida had
informed the Privy Council that the United States was fair in its
negotiations and that the 10:7 ratio would not be insisted upon.
Rather, the ratio was part of a total package to be negotiated.
Also, the Japanese government appeared to accept the 10:6 ratio
and did not support Kato's demand for a 10:7 ratio.
The negotiations had entered a new phase, with the Pacific
status quo playing as important a role as the naval ratio. This
was particularly significant for Japan. The Japanese government
had always been at least equally concerned with the question of
stability in the Pacific and Far East. Now, with naval armaments
connected to the Pacific status quo, the home government could
deal more fully with the latter while presenting the two issues
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to the Japanese people as a package that included compromises,
such as the 10:6 ratio, in order to reach an overall agreement.
A week of intense activity began on December 12, as the
three delegations continued to directly link the naval ratio and
Pacific defenses. In the first of three cables exchanged on the
10th, Baron Kato reported the general views of the delegation.
He informed Tokyo that Hughes would consider the Pacific defenses
question but believed it involved the interests of Great Britain,
France, and the Netherlands as well. Kato hoped to avoid
complicating the situation and so did not inquire into any
details Hughes might have. With respect to the Pacific defenses,
Kato believed that to include Hawaii as the army and navy
ministries wished would result in another deadlock. He therefore
recommended that the delegation concentrate on the
non-fortification of the Philippines and Guam. The delegation
decided to avoid discussing the Japanese islands if possible but
if pinned down, would propose to maintain the status quo in
Kirun, Bouko, Ogasawara, and, if necessary, Amami-Oshima. The
vital point for Japan was the inclusion of the Philippines and
Guam in an agreement. If Hong Kong, Singapore, and any French
territory was added, so much the better.
The two cables from Tokyo responded to the delegation's
earlier messages about the naval ratio and fortifications issue.
Due to the resistance of the United States and Great Britain,
Tokyo dropped the demand for a 10:7 ratio. In order to achieve
success at the conference, the 10:6 ratio would have to be
accepted. The Japanese government decided that to
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counter any unease created by this concession, an agreement on
the maintenance of the status quo of the Pacific would be
necessary. Tokyo then proposed that the status quo be maintained
on "Pacific islands remote from any mainland—outlying insular
possessions. " In reference to Hawaii, the home government did
not object to its exemption should the United States strongly
oppose its inclusion. Essentially, these two cables laid out the
Japanese bargaining position for the second phase of the
negotiations: the reconciling of the 10:6 naval ratio and the
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maintenance of the status quo in the Pacific.
A cable from Washington on the 13th provided an overview of
a meeting between Kato, Balfour, and Hughes, as well as the
progress of the negotiations. First, Hughes made it clear that,
although he approved of a status quo agreement in exchange for
the 10:6 ratio, he could not allow Hawaii to be included.
Balfour then followed suit, agreeing that Hong Kong would be
included in the agreement while Australia and New Zealand would
4-
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not.
In this same meeting, Hughes brought up the one remaining
issue of the naval ratio agreement: the status of the Mutsjj.
The Japanese still claimed it as a completed ship and part of
their sixty percent while Hughes supported his naval experts'
conclusion that the Mutsu was unfinished. Depending upon the
version heard, the Mutsu received her commissioning on November
12, before the conference, or December 1, after it convened.
Hughes stated that retention of the Mutsu would upset the ratio
and recommended adjourning until the next day while the naval
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specialists examined the problem.
To sum up the situation as of December 12, the 10:6 ratio
had been agreed to, but it had not been established whether the
ratio would be based upon the inclusion of the Mutsu in the
Japanese fleet or not. In exchange for the ratio, the United
States and Great Britain agreed to maintain the status quo in the
Pacific in reference to the Philippines, Guam, and Hong Kong,
excluding home territories, Hawaii, Australia, and New Zealand.
Further than that the delegates had not really considered, and
this resulted in further complications.
Over the next three days, Baron Kato, Secretary Hughes, and
Lord Balfour continued negotiating the naval ratio. Hughes and
Balfour ultimately agreed to include the Mutsu in the Japanese
fleet. For compensation the United States would exclude the
North Dakota and Delaware and retain instead the Colorado and
Washington . The trio wrapped up the naval ratio on the 15th when
they agreed that, to maintain her proper ratio, Britain would
construct two new ships of 35,000 British tons each and then
scrap four ships of the King George class. It now remained to
hammer out the details of the status quo agreement.
The discussions of the 15th also touched upon the status quo
agreement, and Kato cabled his thoughts on the subject to Tokyo.
The meeting resulted in a "provisional agreement" between the
three powers, but details had not been worked out. In
particular, Kato avoided discussing the phrase "islands composing
Japan proper," which was included in the agreement. He claimed
that it was not necessary to define the term at that time and
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feared that a final interpretation might not correspond "to the
substance of; the negot Lations" which he had carried on up to that
point.
It is difficult to reach a clear understanding of the
Japanese position on the question of "islands composing Japan
proper," in that as the negotiations continued. Baron Kato and
the home government often seemed at odds with each other. Kato's
secretary at the conference, Ichihashi Yamato, believed that Kato
favored Hughes' and Balfour's interpretation that Amami-Oshima
and the Bonin Islands should be included within the status quo
area but could do little about it except stall the issue.
Ichihashi also believed that there were officials in Tokyo that
disliked Kato and, on occasion, worked to put him in an awkward
114position during the negotiations. Whatever the truth, the
interpretation of "Japan proper" remained an issue throughout the
negotiations of the Pacific status quo agreement.
In his recommendations, Kato argued that maintaining the
status quo of the Philippines and Guam was "very advantageous to
the national defence of Japan." In return, Japan should allow
the inclusion of Formosa and the Bouko Islands in the agreement.
Also, Kato argued that the Bonin Islands -in. I " «m-i i -Oshima be
defined as integral parts of Japan. Although as such they would
be exempt from the non-fortifications agreement, continued
construction of fortifications should be stopped.
Baron Kato recounted the progress of the negotiations in two
cables of December 23 and 24. To the Japanese consul in San
Francisco Kato again emphasized that the inclusion of the
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Philippines and Guam in the status quo agreement achieved "our
objects for our national defence." 116 In both cables Kato
pointed out that Japan's obligated possessions still had not been
identified. In the joint statement issued December 15, the three
powers agreed to maintain the status quo "in regard to the
fortifications and naval bases in the outlying insular
possessions in the Pacific region, including Hongkong, but
excluding the Hawaiian islands, Australia, New Zealand and the
islands composing Japan proper." Kato concluded the cable
with Lord Balfour's insistence that Singapore be exempted from
the status quo agreement.
The question of just what "Japan proper" consisted and just
how wide-ranging the agreement would be surfaced in early
January. In a cable to the Chief of Staff in Tokyo, General
Tanaka, head of the delegation's army advisors, informed Tokyo
that the Americans and British had concluded that specific
details were needed concerning Japan's obligations. At the same
time, Tokyo also decided that the point needed clarification and
instructed the delegation that Amami-Oshima and the Ogasawara
Islands would be part of Japan proper as they came under internal
administration. Since Sakhalin had not come up and Japan's South
Pacific islands were covered by mandate provisions, these would
be exempted from the status quo accord. The possessions included
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would be limited to Formosa and the Pescadores.
The specific obligations of maintaining the status quo now
captured everyone's attention. With the benefit of the
deciphered Japanese cables, Hughes could speculate that Tokyo
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wished to give away as little as possible on this issue. At the
same time Hughes and Balfour now realized that the December 15
statement encompassed much more than they had expected. Everyone
now saw the need to reconsider the scope of the status quo
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agreement.
Tokyo desired that the original statement of December 15
remain the basis of the status quo accord, but this was not to
be. At a meeting of the three dignitaries on January 10, Lord
Balfour proposed that status quo territory be restricted to an
area between 110 and 180 degrees east longitude and between the
equator and 30 degrees north latitude. A cable from General
Tanaka informed Tokyo of this development and also that the naval
advisors were eager to restrict the fortifications of Guam and
the Philippines. Baron Kato therefore believed it would be
advantageous to accept Balfour's plan. General Tanaka favored
standing on the earlier statement but believed that if
concessions must be made then Kato should attempt to change the
demarcation lines to 29 degrees north latitude and somewhere east
of Ogasawara. This would exclude Yakushima to the north and most
of the Pacific mandates in the western Pacific. Since these were
covered under League of Nations mandate regulations, Tanaka saw
no reason to formally restrict them with respect to the United
States. 12 °
A series of three cables to the home government on January
11 and 12 revealed a division between the delegation and the home
government. Tokyo last instructed the delegation to maintain the
December 15 statement as the basis for the status quo agreement.
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After meetings with Hughes and Balfour, Kato no longer believed
that they would support the December 15 statement and recommended
compromise. In a lengthy message, Baron Kato attempted to
explain the events that brought the powers to their present
impasse. Essentially, the December 15 statement was issued in
haste and without due consideration. British recognition that
the statement covered the entire Pacific and all British
possessions therein had prompted the new initiative from Balfour.
Conversations continued over the course of several days with
the Americans and British advancing Balfour's plan plus the
inclusion of Amami-Oshima and Ogasawara, while the Japanese
supported the original statement along with assurances that Japan
had no intention of completing any fortifications on Ogasawara or
Amami-Oshima. Hughes and Balfour argued that, since Japan had
achieved security with the status quo agreement, which she
required as compensation for the 10:6 ratio, then she should
allow the hasty and ill-conceived December 15 statement to be
replaced by a more specific and detailed written agreement. Kato
responded that Japanese public opinion would react unfavorably.
Under continued pressure he recommended acceptance to Tokyo. The
British proposal would not harm Japanese security, while Japan
.
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very much needed the status quo agreement.
Hanihara Masanao, filling in for an ill Ambassador
Shidehara, sent a similar cable to Tokyo. Hanihara went on to
point out that the Americans and British had become suspicious of
Japanese intentions and that this suspicion could easily be
transmitted to the public at large if care were not taken.
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Echoing Kato, Hanihara argued that the British initiative did not
damage Japanese security and hoped Tokyo would allow the
100delegation to compromise on it.
Finally, Baron Kato sent a follow-up to his cable of the day
before. Kato informed Tokyo that since the non-fortification
clauses were a condition for the acceptance of the 10:6 ratio,
non-agreement on the first would theoretically revoke the second.
This would place Japan in a very disadvantageous position. Since
Britain and the United States required the written inclusion of
Amami-Oshima and Ogasawara in the agreement, Japan had three
courses of action open to her: 1) assent to the new revised
proposal 2) oppose the new proposal and stand on the published
announcement 3) oppose the new proposal and withdraw the sixty
percent ratio. Kato then concluded that only the first course
was practical, "under the circumstances it is impossible to carry
through our contentions and there is nothing to do but accept
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it."'
Hughes' negotiating had been consistent in its course and
objectives up to this point. He opened the conference with a
proposed naval ratio of 10:10:6 plus a naval holiday and limits
on construction, and maintained this position throughout,
achieving it over a Japanese desire for a 10:7 ratio. Hughes
also remained consistent on the non-fortification question.
Hughes knew that the United States would not spend the money
necessary for major fortification construction in the Pacific.
Prom SIGINT decrypts Hughes also knew how important maintaining
the status quo in the Pacific, particularly Guam and the
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Philippines, was to the Japanese. In addition to this, signals
intelligence provided Hughes with information on Baron Kato's
problems with Tokyo, a lack of harmony in policy and at times, a
lack of support. These pieces of information reinforced Hughes'
firm negotiating stance, at least until Balfour proposed to alter
the status quo territory. The Balfour initiative reflected a
realization of the problems inherent in the original statement.
At that point Hughes agreed to support Balfour in the face of
Japanese opposition. The information and tone of the three
cables to Tokyo illustrated the brittleness of the Japanese
opposition. This might have led Hughes to conclude that
continued firmness would break down this opposition. The
delegation bore the pressure of dealing face to face with Hughes
and Balfour and then having to contact Tokyo for instructions.
The Japanese delegates were keenly aware of the shifts in both
American and world public opinion. The genuine desire for a
successful conference bore heavily upon them as well, and a
combination of these resulted in the delegation's urgings to
Tokyo for compromise. Thus, pressure was transferred to the home
government. All in all, the situation was not unfavorable from
Secretary Hughes' standpoint.
Tokyo responded negatively to the new developments,
considering the situation to be quite unfair. Not only did the
Balfour initiative add an enormous obligation to Japan; it
exempted American and British territories such as the Aleutian
Islands and New Guinea. In addition, should the government agree
to replace the December 15 statement with this new plan, it would
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cause hard feeling among the Japanese people towards the United
States and Great Britain, as well as toward the Japanese
government. Tokyo stated that it was therefore impossible to
change the text of the agreement but, significantly, concluded
with the possibility of drafting an annex which would include
Ogasawara and Amami-Oshima. By offering to add an annex to the
statement, the Japanese government weakened its position;
previously it would not formally consider including the two
islands. 124
To emphasize the role of the media and public opinion on
this issue, Tokyo cabled a survey of Japanese news stories to the
delegation. All of the papers in the capital now addressed the
issue, primarily focussing on Ogasawara. The consensus concluded
that it was wrong to include Ogasawara within the restricted
zone. The Asahi considered it unfair to restrain Japan from
maintaining defenses on territory defined in Japan as "Japan
proper. " The Yorozu Choho classified the inclusion of Ogasawara
as a "blunder" which "voluntarily" resulted in an endangering of
125
the national defense.
The desire to settle the status quo question and avoid
disrupting the conference influenced General Tanaka as well as
the diplomats of the Japanese delegation. Cablinq Tokyo on
January 16, Tanaka indicated that Baron Kato believed Japan
should continue to work for a compromise. In Kato's estimation,
refusing to sign an agreement could only damage Japan's position
and stature. Tanaka followed with his opinion that the
compromises advocated by the Japanese government would probably
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not satisfy Great Britain and the United States. Instead, Tanaka
proposed that the three powers scrap the December 15 statement
and begin again. If the United States, Great Britain, and Japan
were to pledge in writing to maintain the status quo of the
Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, Formosa, Ogasawara and Oshima, all
would achieve their objectives. Thus, one more voice joined
those advocating a Japanese compromise. 126
The succession of cables from the delegation to Tokyo
throughout January indicated their concern over the course of the
negotiations on the status quo issue. Both the tone and
substance of the communications provided information from which
Hughes perceived a wavering on the part of the delegation.
Certainly their acknowledgement of Tokyo's desires was tempered
by their own doubts as to the feasibility of accomplishing the
home government's objectives.
In a remarkable cable sent January 17, Kato actually put
forward a defense of the American and British position. After
acknowledging Tokyo's reasons why Japan must remain firm, Kato
responded with two points. First, he commented that originally
the status quo agreement aimed at removing an actual menace to
Japan. From this basis Kato believed it difficult to justify not
signing an agreement on the grounds that the December 15 text had
been altered or discarded. The crux of the issue, Japan's
security, would be achieved with Balfour's initiative as well as
the December 15 statement. In his second point, Kato stated that
the term "Japan proper" had been decided upon suddenly and
without forethought. Although the Japanese naturally considered
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Amami-Oshima and Ogasawara as included within this phrase and
therefore exempted from the agreement, Kato had negated this by-
stating that Japan did not object to limiting fortifications on
these islands. Thus, Kato reasoned that whenever Hughes and
Balfour used the phrase they naturally did not include the
aforementioned islands. This cable must have made quite
interesting reading for Hughes in that Kato was now doing Hughes'
.
.
127job for him by presenting the Anglo-American position.
Tokyo once more weakened its position in its instructions of
January 21. Again arguing the significance of the published
December 15 statement, Tokyo announced it could not permit any
"considerable change" in the substance of the agreement. Tokyo
then gave the delegation permission to negotiate an agreement to
maintain the status quo of Amami-Oshima and Ogasawara as long as
it was clear that these islands were included as part of Japan
proper. Tokyo wished that the difficult position of the Japanese
government be made known to Hughes and Balfour, but this time did
not contend that their position was made inflexible by domestic
cons i derat ions .128
The negotiations continued doggedly. From a radio intercept
it was learned by the Black Chamber that Kato again recommended
acceptance of the British proposal. Kato had met with Balfour on
the 22nd at which time Balfour sought to put any misapprehensions
to. rest. Hanihara then sent the first of two cables to Tokyo.
In it he pointed out the delegation's difficult and awkward
position of continually requesting instructions from the home
government. Hanihara hoped the delegation would receive the
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necessary latitude in order to settle the issue "by a prompt,
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decisive stroke.
At a meeting the morning of January 22, Baron Kato offered
Hughes counter-proposals based upon instructions from Tokyo. The
south part of Sakhalin Island would be exempted from the
agreement but would remain unfortified as per the Russo-Japanese
treaty. The Aleutian Islands would be included in the status quo
agreement while the Kurile Islands would be exempted. There were
numerous small islands south of Japan proper and these would have
no naval bases established on them. Hughes and Kato then decided
to meet again after they had separately discussed the situation
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with Lord Balfour.
At a meeting the evening of the 23rd, Hughes proposed that
Alaska and the Panama Canal be excluded from the area of
limitation. This reflected both an oversight on Hughes' part and
the fact that Japan retained the freedom to fortify the Kurile
Islands if she desired. Also, Hughes argued that Okinawa be
included within the area of limitation. Since it was closer to
the Philippines than Amami-Oshima, he would have difficulty
explaining to the Senate the latter' s inclusion while the former
was excluded. Baron Kato then explained the domestic difficulty
arising from the Okinawa proposal but Hughes stood firm and
merely restated his propsal. Kato concluded that the United
States would make no further concessions. He informed Tokyo of
„ ^ i i 131
this and recommended that Japan accept Hughes proposal.
Hanihara endorsed Kato' s recommendation of acceptance and so
informed Tokyo. According to Hanihara, if considered with
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composure, Hughes' proposals relative to Alaska, the Panama Canal
and Okinawa (the Loochoo or Ryukyu Islands) were not
unreasonable. Since the delegation's military experts did not
believe the new proposals made any strategic difference, Hanihara
advised acceptance of Hughes' proposal. This would settle the
issue and avoid damage to Japanese prestige by arguing for the
right to fortify an island group south of Amami-Oshima, which
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Japan had already agreed would not be fortified.
By this point the delegates as well as the negotiations were
nearing the end. Ambassador Shidehara pointed out to Tokyo that
the negotiations had lasted two and a half months and that the
delegates were extremely tired. In order to shorten the
conference, Shidehara and Hughes secretly agreed to slide over
Japan's occupation of parts of Russian Siberia, a potential
source of prolonged debate. Shidehara would explain the Japanese
position and Hughes would follow with a history of past
negotiations and the American position. At that point, Hughes
would close discussion without the adoption of any concrete
resolution or debate. As for the status quo issue, Shidehara
saw no choice other than acceptance of the American and British
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proposals which he too considered reasonable.
Hughes briefly discussed the situation at a dinner given by
the Dutch minister the evening of the 25th. He pointed out to
Kato that American public opinion had taken a negative turn in
respect to Japan and that this attitude was being transferred to
the Senate. Kato informed the Japanese government of this and
argued that as Japan had achieved her original aims, an agreement
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should be reached immediately. Kato hoped that Tokyo could make
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a decision without the continued exchange of cables.
Tokyo responded on January 28 with her final concessions.
Although it would cause domestic problems, the inclusion of
Okinawa was reluctantly accepted. Since the Kuriles were to be
included as well, Tokyo required that in the "spirit of
cooperation" the United States allow the inclusion of the
Aleutians.
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On the afternoon of the 30th, Kato and Hughes
held a meeting at which time Hughes agreed to the Japanese
counter-proposal. The negotiations over the status quo articles
ended, and the delegates quickly published the terms of the
agreement.
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Chapter IV. After the Conference: Yardley and the decline of
the Black Chamber
The State and War Departments continued sharing support of
the Black Chamber for the seven years following the conference.
Interdepartmental jealousy persisted with the State Department
excluding the Navy from the intelligence set-up. " The effort
to exclude the Navy from the operation even went as far as an
Army denial of the existence of the Chamber and therefore a de
facto refusal by the Army of aid to the Navy's new COMINT unit,
13 7
created in the mid-1920' s. As it had prior to the
conference, the Chamber concentrated on solving foreign
diplomatic codes. The staff made no effort to train people in
the methodology of cryptanalysis, since this was not part of
their mission, and also there was no one to train. The size of
the staff declined in the 1920' s, and its only mission involved
the solving of specific codes and ciphers. The Chamber's tasks
did not include creating new codes and ciphers, ways to transmit
or transport them, nor any of the other related activities of the
communications security field. The Chamber's lack of work in
these affiliated areas played a part in its demise in 1929 and
the reorganization of the War Department's signals intelligence
service.
In early November 1922, Colonel Stuart Heintzelman, head of
Military Intelligence, recommended Yardley for the Distinguished
Service Medal. General John Pershing endorsed the
recommendation, citing Yardley' s services during World War
77
I. Yardley received the award in January 1923, for
"exceptionally meritorious and distinguished services during the
World War." At the time, Yardley believed that the award
actually reflected an appreciation for his services during the
Washington Conference. This was quite plausible and even
repeated as fact in newspaper obituaries at the time of his
a ..*,
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death.
Fiscal retrenchment and budget cuts throughout the 1920'
s
boded ill for the Chamber's future. The 1921 budget had been cut
in half, down to $50,000 when the War Department reduced its
contribution to $10,000. According to Friedman, the War
Department operated on the theory that as the information
primarily interested the State Department, it should provide the
majority of the funding. 140 Even so, the State Department
reduced its share of the budget as well. In July 1923, the State
Department's monthly funds fell from $3333 to $2083. The State
Department again cut its funding in July 1924, down to $1250 per
month.
141
This severe cut in financial support resulted in a
reduction of the staff by one half, to twelve. For Yardley and
the Chamber the good years were over. Funding remained at this
level of $25,000 per year until the closing of the Chamber in
1929.
The events surrounding the closing of the Black Chamber in
1929 proved to be a major turning point in Yardley' s life. The
process began when Major O.S. Albright of the Signal Corps became
the coordinator of the cryptanalytic and cryptographic services
that existed in the War Department. Albright evaluated the
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situation and concluded that the Chamber's efforts primarily
benefited the State Department. Although the War Department
needed an intelligence unit that could immediately train
additional personnel in time of war, the Chamber did little if
any training. Albright then recommended consolidating all
cryptographic and cryptanalytic agencies within the Signal Corps,
rather than leaving them dispersed among the Signal Corps, the
142General Staff, and the Adjutant General s Office.
At this time, with the inauguration of Herbert Hoover and a
new administration, a new man assumed the position of Secretary
of State, Henry L. Stimson. Unsure of Stimson's attitude towards
the nature of the Chamber's activities, Yardley decided to wait
several months before enlightening Stimson as to the Chamber's
existence. After giving the secretary time to settle in, Yardley
provided Stimson with some reports from the Chamber. As a
believer in international cooperation, Stimson expressed shock at
the Chamber's activities. He valued frankness in diplomatic
relations and did not believe the Black Chamber had a place in
the diplomatic process. As he later stated, "Gentlemen do not
143
read each other's mail." Yardley, in turn, could only have
been dismayed at the secretary's decision to shut down the
Chamber. The Army Chief of Staff, G-2, persuaded Stimson to
delay the closing of the Chamber a few months to allow the
employees time to find other jobs and give the army a chance to
gather up the files and records of the unit. Friedman assumed
the task of transferring all of the Chamber's material to the
I 44Signal Corps.
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According to Friedman, Yardley had been moonlighting to
supplement his income, including such activities as commercial
code compilation, real estate sales, and acting as consultant to
commercial firms on code matters. 145 Friedman hints at a
conflict of interest in these activities. In discussions of the
reorganization of the signal intelligence services Colonel
Hemphill, Chief Signal Officer, suggested that the Chief of the
M.I.D. code solving section (Yardley) be offered a position "at a
salary considerably below his present." To remain in military
intelligence Yardley would have had to accept a reduction from
$625 per month to $300 per month. 146 Thus, the circumstances
suggest that the new masters of signals intelligence did not
greatly desire Yardley' s services. Either way, Yardley refused
the offer and found himself out of a job.
Albright's handling of the Chamber's closure had been none
too tactful. Essentially, he walked in and told the staff they
were soon to be unemployed. As with Yardley, no real effort was
made to retain the personnel, and in fact, none joined the
reorganized intelligence unit. This could only have embittered
the employees to one extent or another. This was particularly
true of Yardley, at home at the center of things, whether
president of his high school class or in charge of the Black
Chamber. The events that followed involving Yardley and his
revelations about the Chamber are not especially surprising.
Financial success eluded Yardley after the closing of the
Chamber. Yardley, too, felt the effects of the Great Depression
and was unable to find steady employment that suited him. With
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his business ventures failing, Yardley turned to his ex-colleague,
John Manly, for a loan in January 1931. Due to the Depression,
Manly could not afford to make Yardley the loan. Previously, in
the spring of 1930, Yardley had approached a publisher with the
idea for a book which the publisher declined after conferring
with Colonel Stanley H. Ford of G-2. By the spring 1931, Yardley
had resigned his reserve commission and in desperation started
writing, a possibility of which Major Albright had become aware
in the previous spring.
147 In a letter to Colonel Alfred T.
Smith, Army Chief of Staff, G-2, Albright noted that the
Chamber's efforts had been of "great interest" to the Department
of State, but, at the same time, did involve a technical
violation of the law. Concerned at the possibility Yardley might
write an expose of the Chamber's activities, Albright suggested
that the War Department inform Chief Justice Hughes of the
situation, particularly since Yardley possessed a letter of
commendation from Hughes for his efforts during the Washington
148Conference.
Yardley 's book The American Black Chamber went public in the
spring of 1931, first partially in serial form for the Saturday
Evening Post , then as a book. Its reception depended upon the
audience. In April a Captain A.J. McGrail, M. I. (reserve ) penned
a strong protest against Yardley and his articles to Colonel
Smith, Director of Military Intelligence. McGrail claimed that
while Yardley knew little about the secret ink section in which
McGrail had worked, his articles did manage to give away
information known by no more than ten men in the country. He
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concluded by urging that any future articles by Yardley be
149
carefully censored.
In June Albright sent a review of the book to Colonel Smith.
Faced by an embarrassing breach of security, Smith demanded to
know exactly what had been disclosed. Up to that point, the
State Department had fended off the press with evasive replies
while the War Department flatly denied the Chamber's
existence. According to Albright, the book contained many
exaggerations and distortions but "the basic facts in the book
are correct." Albright's principal concern was the possible
effect of the book on America's allies and friendly neutrals. He
feared that giving away their intelligence methods and disclosing
of American success at breaking their codes would anger and
alienate them. The insinuations in chapter twelve that the
Entente plotted to assassinate President Wilson while he attended
the Paris Peace conference alarmed Albright. He also expected
protests from Japan over the Chamber's breaking of her diplomatic
codes during the Chamber's existence. Overall, Albright
considered the book awkward at the minimum and possibly damaging
in the extreme.
The furor building around the book seemed to take Yardley by
surprise. In June 1931, he defended his actions and attacked the
government's policies on signals intelligence in a letter to
Frederick Sullens, editor of the Jackson (Miss. ) News and a
former counter-intelligence officer. Disturbed by the
government's denial of the Chamber's existence, Yardley stated
that he could, if necessary, give the archive number of the
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official memo signed by the Secretary of War in 1919, authorizing
the creation of the Black Chamber. As proof of his patriotism,
Yardley claimed to have turned down the offer of one of the great
152
powers to set up a cryptographic unit at a handsome salary.
Yardley concluded with a blast at the federal government for
relying on antiquated equipment and methods for encipherment . If
the government adopted a machine cipher (along the lines of the
future Enigma), its communications would be unbreakable. Going a
step further, Yardley proved a poor prophet when he asserted that
if all nations adopted such machines then the issue of
communications espionage would be ended, cryptography as a
discipline would become obsolete, as no human could solve the
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ciphers. Sullens sent a short response to Yardley
criticizing him in turn. As one who had served his country with
M.I. -4, counter espionage, Sullens held that it was a sacred
obligation not to reveal any secrets obtained in government
service and thought Yardley should have followed the same
. .
,
154principle.
By the summer of 1931, the Japanese had reacted to Yardley'
s
book. Essentially the Japanese response ranged from upset to
furious. The July 22 edition of the Tokyo Nichi Nichi ran an
article covering the spectrum of attitudes to be found in Japan.
A great deal of criticism centered on the Foreign Ministry and
many blamed Shidehara for the Chamber's success at deciphering
Japanese cables. As ambassador to Washington during the
conference, critics believed it was his responsibility to secure
Japanese communications. Others criticized the United States and
83
expressed regret that such dishonorable behavior ever
, 155
occurred.
Three Japanese newspapers expressed their differing
reactions to the situation. The Japanese Chronicle stated simply
that such activities were "like steaming open people's letters."
On the other hand, the Japan Times assumed a more philosophical
attitude. Deciphering one another's codes was part of the game,
and the United States should not be criticized for going one up
on Japan. Rather, the Foreign Office deserved censure for not
anticipating and countering American efforts. Finally, the Osaka
Mainichi reported that the War and Navy ministries had instructed
attaches to obtain copies of the book for study and that Japan
intended to be prepared to counter such signals intelligence at
the upcoming Geneva Disarmament Conference.
At home Yardley and the federal government both received
criticism for the nature of the Chamber's activities as well as
for their revelation. In an article in Baltimore Sun , one K.K.
Kawakami criticized Yardley for the pride he apparently took in
the Chamber's immoral accomplishments and the government's
sanctioning of such activity. Kawakami argued that such behavior
was not only immoral but even detrimental to international
relations. He cited Scotland Yard's involvement in the 1922
Lausanne Conference between Great Britain and Turkey. The Yard
intercepted Turkish dispatches which were not always
complimentary to Lord Curzon. According Kawakami, this angered
Lord Curzon and led to the rupture of the conference.
Due to the furor surrounding the disclosure of the Chamber's
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existence, the Acting Secretary of War sent a letter to Secretary
of State Stimson, informing him of the Chamber's history. The
letter stated that the Black Chamber had, indeed, been created in
1919 with funds and approval from both departments. But since
funding from the War Department did not begin until June 30,
1921, the State Department, which alone supplied the operating
expenses for the two years from July 1919, was accorded primary
responsibility for the Chamber. In reference to Yardley, the
letter noted that the army discharged him in 1919 and that in
1921 he entered the reserves. While with signals intelligence,
his status remained that of a civilian; and he had resigned his
reserve commission in April 1931. Again, the point of concern
came up that Yardley possessed a letter of commendation from
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former Secretary of State Hughes.
The impact of Yardley' s disclosures continued for months and
fit into the slow deterioration of Japanese-American relations,
which included the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September
1931. In November Major George E. Arneman, a military attache in
Riga, Latvia, reported a conversation with the Japanese Charge
d'Affaires. The Charge d'Affaires stated that the Japanese had
suspected that some of their communications had been deciphered,
adding that he could not understand why Yardley had verified
their suspicions.
159 Perhaps if the Japanese Charge d'Affaires
had known of Albright's handling of the Chamber's closure, he
would have been less surprised at Yardley's action.
In April 1932 Major Edgar S. Miller of the General Staff
received a request from an assistant of a Colonel Stockton
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(reserve). The colonel intended to write a chapter on various
disarmament conferences and wished to know if the material in
Yardley's book was accurate and if Yardley was reliable. Colonel
Alfred T. Smith directed that 'tiller's response include the
following: a) Yardley had not been employed by the government
for some time prior to the book, b) he did not clear the book
with the War Department, and c) the War Department did aot
comment on or review publications and therefore could not affirm
or deny the accuracy or reliability of works or their authors.
In essence, the War Department avoided giving a Cull arid aeoucata
statement of its own.
The controversy surrounding Yardley settled down until
•September 1932 when rumors of a new book surfaced. Stanley K.
'lornbeok, a Par Bast expert at the State Department, became
concerned upon hearing such rumors. The new book entitled
Japanese Diplomatic Secrets evidently went into detail on the
activities of the Chamber during the Washington Conference.
Considering the general effect of the first book, Hornbeck
believed that the government should prevent publication of this
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work. That same month orders for "Immediate Action" were
issued by the War Department. An officer and two witnesses were
to contact Yardley and take possession of any government
documents he might have dating from the period of his
service. The Bobbs-Merri 11 Publishing Company then received
a letter "informing" them of penalties contained in the "spionage
\ab of. 1917 concerning the discl.i^sure of confidential government
documents. The War Department pointed out that according i.o the
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Espionage Act, "...whoever lawfully or unlawfully having
possession of, access to, control over, or being entrusted with
any document. .. relating to the National Defense wilfully
communicates or transmits or attempts to communicate or transmit
the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or lawfully
retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer
or employee of the United States entitled to receive it... shall
be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000, or by
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imprisonment for not more than two years or both." The War
Department then strongly recommended that any future books along
the lines of The American Black Chamber be cleared before
v,t t - 164publication.
A letter from the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in
September 1932 advised the War Department that a literary agent,
Viola Irene Cooper, had taken the manuscript to Bobbs-Merrill
which refused it and that she was now considering approaching the
Macmil Ian Company. A note attached, initialed A.T.S. (Smith)
stated that Miss Cooper would be visited by the Assistant
District Attorney at New York City and be advised not to publish
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the book due to the effects of Yardley's previous work.
After five to six months, the issue of Yardley's second book
came to a head. On February 17, 1933, the Justice Department
received a letter from the United States Attorney in New York.
He informed them that the Macmillan Company had just received
Japanese Diplomatic Secrets and he could arrange a reading, if so
desired. A handwritten note added to the letter indicated that
it was shown to the Army Chief of Staff, General Douglas
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MacArthur, who agreed a copy should be given to the Assistant
Secretary of State. It was also suggested that the Justice
Department be asked to secure the manuscript for the State and
War Departments to examine.
Three days later, February 20, 1933, United States Marshalls
seized the manuscript at the Macmillan Company's offices. The
Justice Department impounded it under Section 20, Title 50 of the
United States Code which prohibited agents of the government from
appropriating secret documents. George P. Brett of the Hacmillan
Company and George T. Bye, Yardley's literary agent, were ordered
taken to the Federal Building by Assistant District Attorney
Thomas E. Dewey, there to testify before a grand jury.
Department of Justice agents had been searching for secret
documents which Yardley purportedly kept after leaving the
Cryptanalytic Bureau. According to friends, Yardley had offered
the documents to the government but the offer had been refused.
Yardley was questioned, but no charges were brought against him
or any other individual.
With the seizure of the manuscript, Yardley's cryptographic
revelations came to an end. The War Department concluded the
affair with a memo for the Chief, Public Relations Branch, G-2,
that personnel should be on the lookout for any other works by
Yardley. Book notices and the like should be scrutinized and no
discussion of the subject should take place within the
branch.
Yardley never again worked in signals intelligence for the
United States. He went overseas and worked in signals
intelligence for Chiang Kai-shek 'o«i:oc« going bo Canada and
setting up a cryptanalytic bureau there. Rumor had it that he
was Eo.'aHd to leave Canada due to pressure fro«t Secretary of
State Stlmson or the British.
1 He returned to the United
"takes tf'iara he died in 1958.
As for the Black Chamber, Its duties remained reassigned to
the War Department anil the doors never reopened. Still, 'or a
decade the American Black Chamber fulfilled a perceived need,
primarily for the State Department. In a period when both the
role and morality of signals intelligence had not been clearly
defined, the Chamber provided the State Department with
information on the activities of foreign powers. The efforts
during the Washington Conference were the most dramatic but not
necessarily the most important. The primary task of a signals
intelligence unit is to work with the routine, day to day
communications of foreign nations. Since we do not know
completely what the Chamber deciphered in the years after the
conference, we cannot be sure of its influence or impact. In any
event, the Black Chamber did occupy a position in the line of
continuity In signals intelligence stretching Ceo® Room 40 during
World War I, to the units working on ULTRA, and 'Pi-STC in World War
IT, and finally to the sophisticated signals intelligence units
oT today.
p. 166.
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Chapter V. Conclusion: The Black Chamber's Influence
In assessing the Black Chamber's impact at the Washington
Conference three questions need to be addressed. First, what
information did the Black Chamber provide Charles Evans Hughes
previous to and during the conference? Second, from the existing
evidence how does it appear Hughes utilized this information?
Did the information fit in as one of many pieces, forming the
whole of the American position before the conference and
confirming such a position during the negotiations? Or, did the
Chamber's efforts provide a breakthrough, resulting in a radical
change in Hughes' goals and negotiating strategy once the
conference had opened? Finally, if the Chamber's efforts appear
to have had a minimal or unspectacular impact at the conference,
then why7 Did a credibility gap exist or was the material not
relevant, or useful only as a confirmation of Hughes'
preconf erence position?
The Black Chamber provided Hughes with an assortment of
information prior to the convening of the conference. A number
of cables indicated two principal Japanese concerns. First,
Tokyo wished to know the scope and context of the agenda before
committing Japan to the conference. Both Tokyo and various
Japanese ambassadors voiced caution on this subject. Ultimately,
Japan agreed to attend the conference, believing her public image
and the potential gains of such an endeavor outweighed any
potential dangers to foreign policy aims. Japan's second concern
revolved around the imminent expiration of the Anglo-Japanese
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Alliance and the general strategic balance in the Pacific and Par
Sast. ProoonEerence cables implied More anxiety over this to^iin
than thai: of arma'Dent reduction. The Anglo-Japanese Mliauce had
been Instrumental i i Japan's rise to prominence in the 'af "a-it,
and she feared a dsclin i 1 'm: 3t raV^jlc position if. the
alliance ended.
The July 11 cable to Tokyo Erom lount Ishii in Paris again
touched upon the status quo in the Pacific. Tshii 'eared that
discussing Anglo-Japanese and Japanese- Ynarican relations at the
conference would probably result in changing the .status quo, if
not the strategic balance in the Pacific and Par East. Ishii
also touched upon the possibility of reorienting Japan's foreign
policy, a subject favored by other Japanese diplomats. Ishii
argued that public support for armaments reduction would make it
possible to remove the "militaristic element" in Japanese foreign
policy if Tokyo so desired.
The haggling over a preconf erence meeting and where to hold
it indicated to Hughes that Japan and Great Britain were not
coordinating their efforts against the United States.
Preconference cables uade it clear that Japan was essentially
eoncerned over the agenda and somewhat confusrtd about '.he issue
of a preliminary meeting. Each of the thro; powers suspected the
other two of collusion before they finally settled the dispute.
The evidence that Japan and Great Britain •/•< e not "forking
together before the conference could only have eased any concerns
Hughes may '\^-.''. ha 1 iLi'tj s ich Mh^ \a it cinei out, once the
conference convened it was Hughes and Balfour that -iujjor-ted each
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other and placed pressure on the Japanese delegation.
The preconference efforts of the Black Chamber also provided
Hughes with strong indications of the overall Japanese attitude
towards the conference. The various cables between Japan and her
ambassadors made it clear that they favored the conference and
hoped very much to achieve tangible results if the conference
convened. A successful conference could curtail defense
expenditures and reduce taxes while eliminating the possibility
of an expensive and dangerous naval race. The preconference
cables made it clear that the Japanese public favored attending
the conference and that Japanese diplomats were very concerned
with Japan's public image, both domestic and foreign. Thus, if
Japan accepted her invitation to the conference Hughes could
assume that her efforts for success would be serious and
sustained.
Finally, the October 20 cable from Tokyo to Washington laid
out the framework within which Japan would negotiate throughout
the conference. Japan would modify her army and navy, present
and building, provided she maintained her "proper ratio" with the
United States and Great Britain and the status quo of the Pacific
did not substantially change. A survey of the negotiations
illustrates that Hughes, Balfour, and Kato worked within this
framework during the conference. In negotiating, Hughes
emphasized the naval ratio while Kato remained equally concerned
with the Pacific status quo. Lord Balfour generally allowed
Hughes and Kato to have the initiative with the exception of his
proposal to replace the December 15 statement.
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Once the conference opened, the cables deciphered by the
Black Chamber generally dealt with one of four subjects: the
naval ratio; public opinion and a successful conference; the
status quo of the Pacific; and recommendations for compromise and
acceptance of Anglo-American terms. Once the conference
convened, Hughes focused upon the naval treaty, and much of the
Black Chamber's information dealt with this during the first four
to five weeks of the conference. From the deciphered cables,
Hughes learned that Ambassador Hayashi in London generally
approved of the opening proposal, favored the financial savings
and embraced the opportunity to change the direction of Japan's
foreign policy away from military preparations.
During the month of November the Black Chamber deciphered a
number of cables dealing with the naval ratio. On the 11th the
delegation informed Tokyo of their proposed "middle plan" of a
10:7 ratio and equality in aircraft carriers. This indicated
that the delegation originated the 10:7 ratio demand, a fact
confirmed by Baron Kato the following spring. ' Deciphered
cables from Tokyo contained various instructions to the
delegation for negotiating the ratio: maintain the 10:7 ratio,
allow Japan to keep the Mutsu , avoid a "clash" with the United
States and Great Britain and ultimately, accept the 10:6 ratio
with the Mutsu and a status quo agreement.
In addition to the Black Chamber's deciphered cables, Hughes
received Ambassador Warren's reports from Tokyo. These were less
important for any information about the actual Japanese
negotiating proposals than for what they told Hughes about the
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attitudes of the Japanese government and public towards the
conference and also the support, or lack of it, the delegation
received from Tokyo. Further, Hughes was able to compare
Warren's reports with the Chamber's decripts as a cross-check for
accuracy, a confirmation of each other's information. From these
sources Hughes generally had a rather complete picture of the
Japanese delegation's negotiating position, instructions and
support at home.
In reference to public opinion, deciphered cables confirmed
that Tokyo in large part directed the press and various
organizations, which in turn influenced the attitudes of the
Japanese public. It is probable that Hughes was less sympathetic
to the delegation's arguments of public pressure knowing that
Tokyo in large part manipulated the situation. On the other
hand, Hughes knew of the delegation's genuine concern over
foreign public opinion and Japan's image, particularly if the
conference failed and the responsibility appeared to be Japan's.
Throughout the conference Tokyo received cables from diplomatic
officers arguing that Japan's security required a successful
conference and that her prestige would suffer as well as her
security if the conference failed.
The two other subject categories were intertwined: the
status quo issue and recommendations of compromise and
concession. From cables such as that of December 1, Secretary
Hughes learned the high degree of importance Japan placed on the
fortifications question. The delegation believed Japan's
security required a status quo agreement and clearly said so to
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Tokyo. As the conference continued, more and more often Tokyo
received cables advocating acceptance of the latest
Anglo-American position. From January 11 until the signing of
the naval treaty at the end of the month, no fewer than ten
cables to Tokyo urged acceptance of the situation.
In order to understand how Hughes utilized the Black
Chamber's information, it is necessary to consider his
preconf erence preparations, opening position and the subsequent
negotiations. As might be expected, prior to the conference
Secretary Hughes received various pieces of information. The
State Department, the Navy and its General Board, the Army, other
government agencies, and politicians all contributed information
of one type or another. Within this context the Black Chamber,
too, contributed information for Hughes to evaluate before the
conference convened.
After deliberation, the American delegation decided to
concentrate on armament limitation. Hughes' opening speech
reflected this by focusing on the limiting of naval construction.
For the next two weeks Hughes, Kato and Balfour concentrated
almost exclusively on the naval ratio, paying only minimal
attention to Pacific or Far Eastern issues. The General Board's
preconf erence armament limitation study had argued strongly
against the introduction of Pacific bases and fortifications into
the conference, and this coincided with the delegation's desire
to deal with the more dramatic and tangible armaments issue.
Once the Japanese delegation introduced the possibility of a
status quo agreement to break the deadlock over the naval ratio,
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tj/ia* incorporated It Into liifl naval treaty negotiations.
^ ighes remained consistent in his terms throughout the
negotiations. He quickly announced that Hawaii ««W ^ sxola.W
from any agreement and agreed to include two other
American
possessions: the Philippines and Guam. The knowledge
chat
Congress would not appropriate the necessary funds
to fully
fortify them undoubtedly influenced Hughes' decision.
The
deciphered Japanese cables declaring it imperative that
Guam and
the Philippines be included in any such
agreement may also have
figured in his considerations. Hughes' one
significant change in
negotiating tactics occurred when he threw his
support behind
Balfour's plan to delineate the area covered by
the status quo
agreement. Upon examination it is clear that
this change
relected a realization of the problems inherent
in the December
15 statement encompassing the whole of the
Pacific, and not a
response to some new intelligence "bombshell."
To conclude, Hughes' preference information painted
this
picture: everyone at the conference was receptive
to *r<w»4ta
Miction and limitation; the Japanese were very concerned
about
tha Viglo- Japanese alliance and the stability or
the Pacific and
VW HMti the US Congress would not appropriate the necessary
funds for the massive construction of Port 1
f. icat Ions ul cH
Pacific; added to all of this was Hughes' own
U.UUati j.i t
concentrate on armament, reduction and 1 imitation.
Therefor.,
Hughes' amp' ti
incorporation 3c tha at-iti, j io 5
negotiations reEl.act*d the information provided
him before
on naval armaments at the outsat and hi
:he Pacific into the
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conference, which dove-tailed with what he wished to accomplish
from the outset. Thus, Hughes remained consistent in his aims
throughout the negotiations.
After examining Hughes' actions before and during the
conference it appears that the Black Chamber functioned as an
information provider in two general capacities. First, prior to
the conference the Black Chamber provided information that Hughes
and the American delegation assimilated with other sources into
the general American position. The Black Chamber therefore
provided some of the pieces which made up the whole.
Once the conference opened evidence suggests that the Black
Chamber acted as a confirmer of the American position and Hughes'
objectives. Hughes' negotiating consistency argues that
Yardley's unit provided information that supported Hughes
preconference aims, and did not prompt any radical change in the
American position. If, instead, the Black Chamber had deciphered
cables stating that Japan intended a quick occupation of the
Philippines and Guam in the near future, then Hughes surely would
have considered altering his negotiating strategy to offset such
a tangible threat. Again, if deciphered cables had indicated a
strong Japanese inclination or plan to accelerate and expand her
occupation of China, and strongly fortify her various Pacific
possessions, then again Hughes might well have reevaluated
American security requirements. For example, he might have
advocated increasing the American naval superiority, adjusting
the status quo terms, or perhaps considered fostering closer
Anglo-American ties in the Pacific. It was the lack of just this
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type of information that strengthens the probability that the
Black Chamber confirmed and reinforced Hughes' position at the
Washington Conference. The contents of the cables established
their relevancy, and the dissemination of intelligence data to
the White House and State Department testified to its
credibility.
The Black Chamber also performed one other task for Hughes.
It supplied an inside look at the Japanese delegation and the
home government in Tokyo. By reading the deciphered cables
Hughes was able to piece together a crude profile of the Japanese
to compare with his face to face impressions. With this profile
Hughes could then gauge more accurately the intent of the
Japanese, and their inclinations and determination at the
bargaining table. For example, after reading the cables one is
struck by the Japanese commitment to making the conference a
success and, as time passed, the delegation's growing conviction
that an agreement on any of the terms discussed at Washington was
preferable to no agreement at all. This revelation of Japanese
intentions reached its height during the last two weeks of the
negotiations over the status quo agreement, as one cable after
another recommended compromise and acceptance of the
Anglo-American terms.
The activities of the Black Chamber also fit into a larger
context than simply the Washington Conference. Yardley and the
Chamber existed during a period of technical and moral transition
in the late 1800 's and throughout the twentieth century. The
application of new forms of communication to military
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intelligence lay at the heart of the transition. The developing
emphasis on world-wide cable systems for stategic reasons
illustrated this. Cable systems provided the means to quickly
contact far-flung parts of an empire. This enabled instructions
to be given for mobilization, strategic plans to be implimented,
and counter moves to enemy activity to be made. Tapping into
such communication systems could also provide information on
enemy capabilities and intentions. Since knowledge of
capabilities and intentions results in advantage, the military
explored various means to intercept enemy messages.
World War I was a wartime laboratory for testing the
usefulness of signals intelligence. Whether intercepting German
naval orders to the High Seas Fleet, listening to radio messages
sent in the clear, or deciphering the Zimmerman diplomatic
message, SIGINT proved its value. World War I confirmed that
signals intelligence had wartime applications that could produce
tangible results.
The Washington Naval Conference demonstrated that SIGINT'
s
uses need not be restricted to the battlefield. Hughes'
endorsement of Yardley's and the Chamber's efforts pointed out
that SIGINT could produce results in peace as well as war. The
reading of Japanese cables containing information such as
alternative negotiating plans or the strength of official support
for the delegates aided Hughes in achieving his own conference
objectives. Hughes and the State Department appreciated such
efforts and wished to maintain the flow of information. The
State Department continued to support the Chamber's activities
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for seven years after the conference. Indeed, in the 1920' s the
War Department had yet to decide what specific role, if any,
intelligence and SIGINT should play during peacetime— to provide
information, to train personnel, or advance research? Signals
intelligence assumed all of these roles at one time or another
and to one degree or another. Not until the reorganization in
1929 did the Army adopt a more systematic approach.
The evolution in technology continued as well. The
introduction of machine ciphering in signals intelligence began
in the late 1920 's and continued into World War II and after.
Yardley's belief in the security of such enciphering machines
reflected his enthusiasm for this novelty. Although- Yardley
predicted that the unbreakable enciphering machine would be
produced, events proved him wrong. What man created he could
also destroy or, as in the case of ciphering machines such as
Engima and Purple, break down or circumvent.
There also transpired a shift in attitudes towards SIGINT,
as those in contact with its product reappraised its usefulness
and place within the bureaucracy. From World War I to World War
II the locus of American signals intelligence shifted from the
military to the State Department and back again. Although
partially funded by the War Department, the Black Chamber was a
civilian unit primarily concerned with deciphering diplomatic
messages for the State Department. By the 1930' s, the Army and
Navy had assumed control of SIGINT, and they provided the State
Department with SIGINT' s product for diplomatic intelligence.
Intertwined with the question of where signals intelligence
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belonged bureaucrat ically was the issue of its appropriateness or
morality. Secretary Hughes and the State Department found the
Chamber quite useful and, while perhaps illegal, certainly
"moral" enough to maintain it throughout the 1920's. In
contrast, Henry L. Stimson did not believe signals intelligence
had a place in dipolmacy and shut down the Chamber. Friedman and
Safford both attributed the shortage of funds for signals
intelligence, in part, to Yardley's book and the controversy it
engendered. By 1940, as Secretary of War, Stimson had changed
his mind and welcomed the efforts of MAGIC. In 1929, the world
looked for peace and "Stimson. .. was dealing as a gentleman with
the gentlemen sent as ambassadors. " By 1940 there were
precious few gentlemen to be found.
Perhaps the controversy surrounding Yardley's book best
illustrates the vague status of signals intelligence during the
1920's and 1930' s. Many lauded its accomplishments, including
some Japanese, while others viewed the activities of the Chamber
with distaste or even moral repugnance. Even its role was
ambiguous. Many, particularly military men such as Captain
McGrail, considered military intelligence efforts useful to the
nation and revelations of such activities detrimental to the
national defense. Others such as K.K. Kawakami, an editorial
writer during the Yardley controversy, viewed the very existence
of such an organization as immoral and its secrecy damaging to
the moral fiber of the nation, not to mention its eroding effect
upon diplomatic relations. Friedman asserted that The American
Black Chamber aggravated Japanese-American relations while David
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Kahn stated that American naval officers stationed in Japan for
language study were treated with a new suspicion.
Surveyed as a whole, the period from World War I until World
War II witnessed a change in governmental attitudes towards
secrecy and confidentiality. Entering World War I the Army
expected the British and French to simply hand over their
accumulated intelligence information. In contrast, by 1941
Stimson had purportedly pressured Canada to release Yardley as a
cryptanalyst, certainly in no small part due to his knowledge of
American techniques plus his own expertise. Secrecy was back in
style.
The very origins of the Chamber illustrated changing
attitudes in government. Set up in secret with its funding
camouflaged to avoid detection, the Chamber could scarcely be
tracked down nor the illegal nature of its activities revealed.
The interception of communications broke federal law; but then,
what was not known could not be prosecuted. The shock of
Stimson' s reaction to the Chamber's existence added to the desire
for secrecy. Information from signals intelligence no longer
circulated but went only to the Chief Signal Officer, even 3-2
was by-passed.
The role and effectiveness of signals intelligence at the
Washington Naval Conference has been examined. State Department
officials reading the reports at breakfast were able to verify
other information and sources, and support conclusions previously
reached. Also, Yardley's receiving the Distinguished Service
Medal was and is commonly attributed to his cryptanalytic
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efforts. But what about after the conference? Several points
argue the effectiveness and usefulness of signals intelligence.
First, the letter of commendation from Hughes indicated the State
Department's confidence in the Chamber. Second, that the State
Department valued the Chamber's efforts is supported by that
department's continued funding of the Chamber in the decade after
the conference. When the breakup came, it reflected not
ineffectiveness or inefficiency on the part of the Chamber but a
mixture of perceived immorality in its very purpose and methods
combined with a bureaucratic reshuffling of responsibilities.
Further, the continued existence of signals intelligence units
around the world argued the effectiveness of 3IGINT for military
and aiplomatic purposes. After the Chamber's dissolution, the
Army continued cryptanalytic work within the Signal Corps while
the Navy consistently maintained support of the unit it set up in
the mid-1920' s.
Ultimately, the significance of the Black Chamber was
twofold. First, as an example of signal intelligence's
usefulness. The Chamber provided Hughes with information prior
to the conference which he incorporated into the formulating of
the American negotiating positon. During the conference the
Chamber provided Hughes with decripts that indicated the American
objectives were still obtainable, based on the Japanese position
and instructions from Tokyo. The Chamber's other significance
lay in its position as a link in the continuity in signals
intelligence in the twentieth century, from Room 40 to ULTRA.
The rise and fall of the Chamber reflected the ambiguous place of
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signals intelligence, both morally and bureaucratically. In the
decade from 1919 to 1929, domestic and foreign society had not
decided on the "rightness" of using signals intelligence, as
evidenced by the controversy over Yardley's revelations. At the
same time, the multiple sources of funding and the switching of
SIGINT from the State to the War Department left unanswered the
question of bureaucratic responsibility and jurisdiction for
signals intelligence. Although the bureaucratic question is less
of an issue today, many still question the morality of such
activity, if not its necessity.
Chapter V Notes
170Thomas H. Buckley, The United States and the
Washington Conference, 1921-1922 , quote of translation of
Baron Kato's speech, March 15, 1922, State Department,
500 A4b/14, (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press,
1970)
,
p. 83.
171 David Kahn, The Codebreakers , p. 360.
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This thesis examines the role of signals intelligence both
prior to, and during the Washington Naval Conference, 1921-1922.
At the same time the paper attempts to place the American
cryptographic unit, the American Black Chamber, under the
direction of Herbert 0. Yardley, within the overall context of
signals intelligence in the twentieth century. This involves the
questions of morality, bureaucratic responsibility, and also the
treatment of signals intelligence in academic literature.
The historiographic literature of signals intelligence
reflects the general perception of SIGINT's role, that of the
dramatic breakthrough changing history. Host of the literature
appeared after the 1974 publication of Th e Ultra Secret by P.W.
Winterbotham. Signals intelligence is generally pictured as the
primary factor in a given dramatic situation, without placing
SIGINT in the process of decision-making or examining that
process. This is a major shortcoming in the field of signals
intelligence study.
Although signals intelligence existed before World War I, as
evidenced by Great Britain's attempt to set up a closed cable
system in the 1330 's and the Dreyfus Affair at the turn of the
century, the First World War more completely realized SIGINT's
potential. The British set up Room 40, a precursor of Yardley's
Black Chamber, at the beginning of the war and it performed
brilliantly throughout the conflict. The US Army responded to
the demands of war and created a cryptographic unit under
Yardley's direction in 1917. After the war the unit was
reorganized as a civilian operation, jointly funded by the State
and War Departments and informally tagged the American Black
Chamber by Yardley.
The Chamber provided Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes
with information both prior to and during the conference. This
information dove-tailed with other sources which Hughes analyzed
and used to formulate the American negotiating position. During
the conference Hughes received intelligence from the Chamber and
reports from -Ambassador 'Jarren in Tokyo. This information
confirmed and reinforced the decisions made before the conference
convened and was a part of the decision-making process.
The closing of the Chamber in 1929 by Secretary of State
Henry L. Stimson reflected the bureaucratic and moral uncertainty
about SIGINT's role. The resulting controversy over Yardley 's
disclosures further emphasized this uncertainty: was signals
intelligence a "legitimate" tool of government? Signals
intelligence continued to be a sensitive subject in government
circles as evidenced by first, the seizure of, and then the
classifying of Yardley" s second manuscript for almost fifty
years.
In the final analysis, this thesis argues that signals
intelligence was and is a part of the decision-making process,
not an independent "maker of history" within a vacuum. The Black
Chamber pc0vide4 Hughes with information both prior to and during
the conference which Hughes controlled and incorporated into the
formulation of American conference policy. At the same time, the
history of the Black Chamber reflects both the continuity in
signals intelligence, and its ambiguous role, bureaucratically
and morally.
